Panpsychism in the Recent Debates about the Mind

Diametros (59):49-64 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to present contemporary varieties of panpsychism, i.e. a metaphysical view according to which at least some of the fundamental properties which constitute the world are mental. Despite its popularity in the history of philosophy, the view has been thought, in the analytic tradition, to be unscientific. Nevertheless, in light of some insolvable problems with the explanation of mind, panpsychism has become a view which is taken seriously as a correct metaphysical theory. In this article, I propose a broad definition of panpsychism in order to uncover the possible causes of its variety. Subsequently, I argue that there are two main motivations to embrace panpsychism: the law of continuity and the acceptance of fundamental monism. Further, I present some problems with panpsychism, especially the problem of combination. In the final part, I suggest that panpsychism should be taken seriously in the recent debates about the mind, regardless of its difficulties.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JARPIT-6
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-07-15
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-07-15

Total views
69 ( #39,088 of 51,670 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #46,854 of 51,670 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.