Molinism and Theological Compatibilism
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):71-92 (2013)
Abstract
In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains,
Molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer
construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical Molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that Molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs a transfer principle about causal inaccessibility that Molina rightfully rejects.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JGEMAT
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-06-08
View upload history
View upload history

No references found.

No citations found.
Added to PP index
2015-06-08
Total views
205 ( #12,655 of 37,214 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #5,973 of 37,214 )
2015-06-08
Total views
205 ( #12,655 of 37,214 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #5,973 of 37,214 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.