Divine Foreknowledge

Religious world-views tend to make many seemingly contradictory claims. A well-known pair is God’s absolute goodness and the existence of intense evil. We present a simple model to show the compossibility of middle knowledge, grounded truth, libertarian free will, physical laws, deism, theism, predestination, evil, hell, a sin-free heaven, God being perfectly just, free, praiseworthy, and necessarily omni­benevolent, omni­scient, and omni­potent, this world being both replete with injustice and the best of all possible worlds, heinous suffering, no-one unjustly suffering, God’s (...) grace for the godly, the prospering of the godless, original sin, human responsibility, trans-world depravity, irresistible grace, and Arminian human choice. Besides that, the model also features an open future, fully grounded tensed facts, and bivalence, and allows for a kind of universalism and a pervasive principle of sufficient reason. The model is not intended to be realistic, but its possibility argues for the possibility that a realistic model containing such compossibles could exist – and even be actual. (shrink)

In Section 1, we begin by asking what, exactly, it might mean for God to “elect” people and how this relates to their agency and freedom. After getting clearer on what God is supposed to elect people to or for, we argue against the view that a person’s will is not involved in the process by which God elects her, which we identify in part as the person’s coming to have faith. But, in Section 2, we consider several reasons for (...) thinking that a person’s free will is not involved in her coming to have faith, as well as a potential problem facing this view. Then, in the next three sections (3, 4, and 5) we examine three views on which one’s free will is involved in one’s coming to faith, corresponding roughly to three systematic views of divine providence. We discuss certain objections to each of these “models of election,” as well as how each speaks to the possibility of the non-elect. In the sixth and final section, we conclude by addressing the concern that any such philosophizing about God is too anthropomorphic. (shrink)

One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism—roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be skeptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized (...) so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle—specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication). (shrink)

Molinists offer a tempting bargain: accept divine middle knowledge, and reap solutions to a number of philosophical/theological problems. The prime benefit we are meant to reap from middle knowledge is a solution to the problem of freedom and providence. I argue that they cannot deliver. Even if we make metaphysical and semantic assumptions that have generally been considered friendly to Molinism, Molinism is in danger of undermining divine providence altogether. This “collapse" persists despite fairly uncontroversial assumptions, and plagues the best (...) Molinist theories defended in the literature. (shrink)

Divine grace is the hand of Christ that sustains the Christian in his acts: such is the mystery explored at the end of the 16th century in the profound studies carried out by various Catholic theologians in a debate in Spain known as the “Controversy on divine aids” (de auxiliis). Its problematic covers both the drama of the loving agreement between divine initiative and human response, as well as the subtle questions of causal determinism or freedom of the will. In (...) this book, the participation of one of the main Dominicans involved in this dispute, Pedro de Ledesma, one of the last members of the School of Salamanca, is studied for the first time. For this purpose, his manuscript work is reviewed, contrasting it with the teachings of other Dominicans of the time. This also makes it possible to show that among the theologians of the Order of Preachers, despite their profound coincidences, there were also different approaches to providence, predestination and divine grace. Thus, this book provides a specific introduction to Ledesma, whose understanding of physical premotion is quite original, but it also provides a broad overview of the early years of the controversy on grace in the Iberian Peninsula. (shrink)

Divine providence, according to Aquinas, is the order of divine wisdom by which it leads creatures to their end. The existence of necessary, contingent and free things is part of this disposition. The infallible character of divine knowledge and will is not at odds with the fallible nature of things ordained by God: providence has infallibly disposed things to happen in a fallible way. Even the acts of human freedom are under the direction of divine mind, for the creator cooperates (...) with free will. The care of divine providence is studied by Aquinas in a special way in his Commentary on the Book of Job, which constitutes the second part of this paper. In this work, he envisages how human evil and suffering are remedied by divine providence. There are rational arguments that shed some light on the problem of human suffering. However, it is the gaze of faith that provides the ultimate confidence in the salvation of sinful and suffering man. (shrink)

This article studies the notion of providence as exposed by John Philoponus in two theological works, 'De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum', where he studies providence in contrast with Neoplatonism, and 'De opificio mundi', in which he returns to the same topic in polemic with astral determinism. Drawing on elements of Neoplatonic philosophy, he argues against the thesis of the eternity of the world and harshly criticizes astral determinism in accordance with the antideterminist line previously defended by other Christian authors such (...) as Origen. (shrink)

The Dominican Pedro de Ledesma was a member of the School of Salamanca, professor of Theology in the late 16th and early 17th century. Here we investigate for the first time his contribution to the «de auxiliis» controversy, in which mainly the Dominicans and the Jesuits contended about human free will and God’s influence on it. Among the various theological problems involved, this thesis examines the nature of the divine concurrence in free human action and, in particular, divine concurrence in (...) actual efficacious grace. Ledesma focuses his contribution to this debate on the real (and not only moral) difference between sufficient and efficacious grace. Another original feature of his conception of divine concurrence and efficacious grace are the target of his attacks, since he does not only dispute the theology of the Jesuit Luis de Molina, but also that of several Dominicans, such as Juan Vicente de Astorga; likewise, he opposes Pedro de Herrera and Diego Álvarez with a less sophisticated conception of «physical premotion» than theirs. This thesis updates Ledesma’s intellectual biography and contains the most complete list of his manuscript work to date. Ledesma’s ideas are studied on the basis of three documents: first, his unpublished lectures of 1590 on divine concurrence; second, the report on Molina’s Concordia sent to the Inquisition in 1594 (a manuscript hitherto neglected, and transcribed in the Appendix); third, the book on the dispute completed in 1601 and published in 1611. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to provide a philosophical elucidation of the thesis of open theism. This task will be performed by utilising the conception of open theism, Generic Open Theism, provided by Alan Rhoda (and precisified in part by William Hasker). This conception will then be further elucidated through the employment of the notion of libertarianism, as proposed by Robert Kane, which will enable the thesis of Generic Open Theism to be shown to not be subject to two important (...) challenges: the Prophecy Challenge and the Divine Bodgery Challenge—which are challenges that focus on showing the incompatibility of perfect being theism, scripture and providence with the central tenets of Open Theism. Thus, in the end, one will be able to affirm the veracity of Open Theism within a scripturally grounded, perfect being theistic framework. (shrink)

The German philosopher Franz Brentano develops his personal thinking by harmonising his favourite sources: Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz. However, he also goes beyond them, introducing a determinism foreign to Thomas Aquinas and eliminating divine punishments from the future life, thus departing from the Christian position also held by Leibniz. Aristotle is credited with Brentano’s Leibnizian ideas: his God is the author of the best of all possible worlds and, within a deterministic paradigm, leads all souls to immortal happiness.

This book lists the manuscripts related to the 'De Auxiliis' Controversy that are preserved in Rome. This dispute is one of the episodes in Spanish intellectual history with the greatest international resonance, if we take into account the commotion caused in Rome and the secular repercussions it will have within the Catholic and even Protestant sphere. This theological controversy also involves highly topical concepts that attract the interest of contemporary philosophers. This book contains a complete list of the manuscripts preserved (...) in Rome, trying to relate them to each other and to point out which are the most reliable and valuable sources. This involves the description of a considerable number of manuscripts that had not been described in any catalogue until now, and the identification of some unknown works. In addition, several unpublished letters by Domingo Báñez and Luis de Molina are transcribed here. (shrink)

In Nemesius' treatment of providence we find an original and suggestive step in the historical development of this teaching. His treatise 'On the Nature of Man' calls for a special attention that focuses on it not only as a testimony of the reception of ancient thought, but also as a personal contribution. In particular, in addition to his criticisms of the doctrine of fate and the conception of general providence advocated by some pagan authors, we find the introduction of divine (...) freedom as a predominant factor in the presentation of providence. Divine power and its freedom (even with respect to necessary entities) establish a new and specifically Christian approach to the problem. The divine will gains in prominence and, as a consequence, the metaphysical scope of God's power, which is above the creatural concepts of contingency and necessity, is emphasised. Thus, Nemesius anticipates the more complex expositions that would later be given by the medieval scholastics, who, like him, would make an ever wider use of Aristotelian philosophy without limiting themselves to taking Platonism and the other Hellenistic schools into account. (shrink)

Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both (...) Eve’s action and everything else Eve does that influences that action; and that if this is the case, Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the second premise follows from libertarian intuitions about free will. (shrink)

Although much has been written about divine knowledge, and some on divine beliefs, virtually nothing has been written about divine credences. In this essay we comparatively assess four views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views and draw connections to current discussions in philosophical (...) theology. (shrink)

There is a longstanding argument that purports to show that divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with human freedom to do otherwise. Proponents of this argument, however, have for some time been met with the following reply: the argument posits what would have to be a mysterious non-causal constraint on freedom. In this paper, I argue that this objection is misguided – not because after all there can indeed be non-causal constraints on freedom (as in Pike, Fischer, and Hunt), but because the (...) success of the incompatibilist's argument does not require the real possibility of non-causal constraints on freedom. I contend that the incompatibilist's argument is best seen as showing that, given divine foreknowledge, something makes one unfree – and that this something is most plausibly identified, not with the foreknowledge itself, but with the causally deterministic factors that would have to be in place in order for there to be infallible foreknowledge in the first place. (shrink)

Diego de Deza has been designed by Christian Pesch as a premolinist while Friedrich Stegmüller has stressed the alleged disagreement between his version of Thomism and the one professed by later Spanish theologians. This paper aims to revisit this interpretation of Deza’s doctrine of divine foreknowledge by showing its fundamental agreement with Domingo Báñez, especially in placing the divine free will as an ingredient of divine knowledge of created things. Moreover, Deza’s teaching about divine grace brings him quite close to (...) a Bañezian idea of premotion insofar as he supposes a special divine aid for every morally good act. (shrink)

Pedro de Ledesma is one of the Dominican theologians of the School of Salamanca involved in the De Auxiliis controversy, i.e., the disputes around a famous book by Luis de Molina on the relation between divine foreknowledge and providence and our free will. Studying an unpublished manuscript by Ledesma and his 1611 book on this subject, the article shows that he opposed Molina with a Thomistic position that we call deflationary. According to this interpretation, God, in moving the created will (...) to do good actions, does not bring about an entity distinct from volition itself. Contrary to other Thomists, he does not think that the immediate effect of the divine motion of the will is an intermediary entity used by God to produce, with the will, the created free act. Ledesma defends his thesis by using some elements of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, in particular, a minimalist interpretation of the relation between action and passion already present in Domingo de Soto and the specific causality of immanent acts. (shrink)

This article transcribes three unpublished manuscripts by Domingo Báñez. The first is a review on the opuscule by Chrysostom Javelli on predestination. Báñez believes that this writing is Pelagian and advances several arguments which he will later use against Luis de Molina and the Molinists. The second is the last preserved writing by Báñez: a letter to the Master General of the Dominicans where he mentions his hope of seeing an end to the dispute on grace and free will. The (...) third is the account of Báñez’s death including his last words, in which he mentions the famous controversy de auxiliis. (shrink)

Edition of the opuscules by D. Báñez on De auxiliis controversy. There is the critical edition of three manuscripts and the first Spanish annotated translation of the opuscules. The Latin text is disposed together with the translation. An introduction situates the opuscules in its systematic and historical context.

On several occasions, Báñez considered Suárez the main supporter of the Molinist doctrine along with Molina himself. According to Báñez, the main mistake of Molinism is its misunderstanding of freedom. This led him to refine his personal Thomistic theory of freedom. Free will is radically in the intellect and formally in the will. Intellect is the root of freedom because the most important indifference is found in the object, whose connection with the end is understood as not necessary. The intellect (...) aware of this indifference causes a formally free volition that is not incompatible with the effective divine motion. (shrink)

The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus, among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, a Thomistic (...) solution is proposed as an alternative which, by means of a different metaphysical approach to cosmic contingency and freedom of will, defends particular providence without reducing divine activity except in personal sins. (shrink)

I defend my paper “Aquinas, Geach, and Existence”[1]against objections from Luca Gili, who argued that, according to Aquinas, future contingents do not enjoy genuine existence but exist in God’s mind only.[1] Damiano Costa, “Aquinas, Geach, and existence”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 3.

Richard Swinburne recently released a paper titled, “Causation, Time and God’s Omniscience.” In this paper, Swinburne argued that God’s omniscience must be understood in a way that excludes divine foreknowledge. Swinburne deems this a necessary step in order to protect our freedom of the will. The purpose of my paper will be to refute Swinburne’s central argument. The goal of refuting Swinburne’s argument is to maintain the possibility of the compatibility of both divine foreknowledge and free human agency.

It is widely thought that Atemporalism—the view that, because God is “outside” of time, he does not foreknow anything —constitutes a unique solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. However, as I argue here, in order for Atemporalism to escape certain worries, the view must appeal to the dependence of God’s timeless knowledge on our actions. I then argue that, because it must appeal to such dependence, Atemporalism is crucially similar to the recent sempiternalist accounts proposed by Trenton Merricks, (...) Philip Swenson, and Jonathan Westphal, and I conclude by briefly sketching some implications of this result. (shrink)

Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear both (...) (1.) that the dependence response does not beg the question against the proponent of the incompatibility argument and (2.) that the dependence response advances the dialectic whether it is developed as a version of Ockhamism or as a version of multiple-pasts compatibilism. (shrink)

Against an interpretation of Saint Thomas Aquinas’s thought that understands the divine motion of the created will only providing a generic impulse to it, in this article is defended that God moves specifically for every good choice. This motion doesn’t prevent at all the contingency of creatures and neither freedom of choice. Is also shown how Báñez’s thought is quite faithful to Saint Thomas in this and doesn’t intend anything else but simply to make it known and defend it from (...) molinists misinterpretations. That’s why is shown that the divine motion of the will doesnt's make God responsible for sin, especially since that would only be possible if divine causality were not the action of the eternal God, who is outside the created causality. (shrink)

Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of whom supports a (...) different interpretation of the way God acts according to right reason. (shrink)

The article analyzes and criticizes the assumptions of Peter Van Inwagen’s argument for the alleged contradiction of the foreknowledge of God and human freedom. The argument is based on the sine qua non condition of human freedom defined as access to possible worlds containing such a continuation of the present in which the agent implements a different action than will be realized de facto in the future. The condition also contains that in every possible continuation of the present state of (...) affairs, the same propositions about the ‘present past’ (the past before the present moment) are true as are true in the present state of affairs. The paper argues that Van Inwagen’s reasoning is inconclusive, it contains the type of mistake of confusing conditional impossibility with unconditional and presents a methodologically wrong method of solving a philosophical problem. It is because in the very construction of the problem determining the available solution. The article points to the possibility that the human freedom of some action is not excluded by the fact that specific past facts logically entail that this event will occur. (shrink)

A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I challenge in this paper. My aim is to develop an interpretation of God’s essential omniscience according to which God can be wrong even though God never is wrong. If this (...) interpretation of essential omniscience is coherent, as I claim it is, then there is a logically consistent position according to which God is essentially omniscient, God foreknows what human agents will do, and yet it is possible for human agents to do otherwise. Thus, the argument for theological fatalism fails. (shrink)

One way that philosophers have attempted to defend free will against the threat of fatalism and against the threat from divine beliefs has been to endorse timelessness views. In this paper, I argue that, in order to respond to general worries about fatalism and divine beliefs, timelessness views must appeal to the notion of dependence. Once they do this, however, their distinctive position as timelessness views becomes otiose, for the appeal to dependence, if it helps at all, would itself be (...) sufficient to block worries about fatalism and divine beliefs. I conclude by discussing some implications for dialectical progress. (shrink)

John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.

This article examines the notion of providence in the thought of St Justin martyr. First, it is shown the relevance of the question for St Justin, since it was an important topic in his time. Secondly, the comparison to the philosophical context provides a more complete view of St Justin’s position. Thirdly, the notion of providence is considered in the whole of St Justins’ thought. So, the author can conclude that Christian philosophy requires a particular providence which nevertheless allows human (...) and angelic free will. The history of salvation plays also an essential role in the understanding of providence, because some past and future facts (such as original sin or Incarnation) condition the choices of providence at the present. (shrink)

Spanish translation of Cajetan’s commentary on quaestiones 22 and 116 of the first part of the 'Summa'. The translator precedes the text of Cajetan with a broad introduction in which he compares the views of the author with the interpretation of the same problems by Báñez in the context of the 'De Auxiliis' controversy. According to the translator, Báñez would have been more faithful to the thought of Saint Thomas than Cajetan. However, the core of the contribution of this great (...) commentator will also be assumed by Báñez; it was so important for him that he implicitly quoted it in his last words. (shrink)

This is a contribution to an Author Meets Critics special issue on John Martin Fischer's _Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will_.

John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then point (...) out some of the costs of Fischer’s reasoning that come into focus once we notice that the set of hard facts is closed under entailment. (shrink)

Critiques John Martin Fischer's bootstrapping model of divine foreknowledge. Invited contribution to a special journal issue on John Martin Fischer's _Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will_ (Oxford, 2016).

In these pages, we expose the main traits of St. Albert the Great’s doctrine of providence and fate, considered by Palazzo the keystone of his philosophical system. To describe it we examine his systematic works, primarily his Summa of Theology. His discussion follows clearly the guidelines of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, in order to delve into the set of problems faced over the centuries by theological tradition. Albert also restates the reflections of different authors like Boethius or Saint (...) John of Damascus but, in his Summa he incorporates to his reflections also the noteworthy book of Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, which includes some pages on providence. Albert gives his personal solution to the complex questions of providence, destiny and contingency of the world. His conception of providence is developed in the frame of the creative power of the almighty God. God’s knowledge is necessary and inerrant and his providential purposes are infallible, but that does not mean that every event is necessary. He does not communicate His own proprieties to the creatures. In order to understand this problem, Albert recalls the notion of hypothetical necessity coined by Boethius in an Aristotelian framework and the difference between 'necessitas consequentis' and 'necessitas consequentiae' proposed by Alexander of Hales. He also develops his account of providence, closely linked to the topic of fate. However, it would be exaggerated to deem his position deterministic. (shrink)

This article deals with the doctrine of providence in Thomas Aquinas based on the thinking of the French philosopher Christian Godin: divine providence would provide an understanding of the “totality” (totalité) that concerns not only the entire universe but also each individual. Aquinas gives an Aristotelian explanation of chance, luck and contingency from the divine perspective. Omniscience, omnipotence and divine providence, however, do not contradict the existence of either true contingency in the natural world or freedom but, on the contrary, (...) they support them. In short, the two peculiarities of the doctrine of providence in St. Thomas here exposed are: first, that God’s will is the ultimate foundation of all contingency (and not merely the deficiency of secondary causes); second, that the divine causality cannot be reduced to any of the two groups of created causes (necessary or contingent) but it is only known to us by analogy. (shrink)

This article deals with the doctrine of providence in Thomas Aquinas based on the thinking of the French philosopher Christian Godin: divine providence would provide an understanding of the “totality” (totalité) that concerns not only the entire universe but also each individual. Aquinas gives an Aristotelian explanation of chance, luck and contingency from the divine perspective. Omniscience, omnipotence and divine providence, however, do not contradict the existence of either true contingency in the natural world or freedom but, on the contrary, (...) they support them. In short, the two peculiarities of the doctrine of providence in St. Thomas here exposed are: first, that God’s will is the ultimate foundation of all contingency (and not merely the deficiency of secondary causes); second, that the divine causality cannot be reduced to any of the two groups of created causes (necessary or contingent) but it is only known to us by analogy. (shrink)

Over the past four decades, the issue of the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom has been the subject of a great debate in the context of Analytic Philosophy of Religion. Many authors have contributed to the debate by formulating some ‘solutions’, taking inspiration from the thought of classical authors (e.g. Boethius, Aquinas, Ockham). One of these, is inspired by Luis de Molina’s thought. The Author, therefore, aims to present the main theoretical thesis of this solution, following the development (...) in the various publications about this question. The Author also tries to show how the thought of Molina has beeen “translated” in contemporary discourse, the limits of the solution, and make understandable the transition occurred within the debate, which led to the Molinist solution and then to the Open Theism. (shrink)

This Introduction has three sections, on "logical fatalism," "theological fatalism," and the problem of future contingents, respectively. In the first two sections, we focus on the crucial idea of "dependence" and the role it plays it fatalistic arguments. Arguably, the primary response to the problems of logical and theological fatalism invokes the claim that the relevant past truths or divine beliefs depend on what we do, and therefore needn't be held fixed when evaluating what we can do. We call the (...) sort of dependence needed for this response to be successful "dependence with a capital 'd'": Dependence. We consider different accounts of Dependence, especially the account implicit in the so-called "Ockhamist" response to the fatalistic arguments. Finally, we present the problem of future contingents: what could "ground" truths about the undetermined future? On the other hand, how could all such propositions fail to be true? (shrink)

Argues that divine timelessness is at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive for addressing the problem of foreknowledge and future contingents.

In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, Molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical Molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that Molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs (...) a transfer principle about causal inaccessibility that Molina rightfully rejects. (shrink)

It is not uncommon to think that the existence of exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge uniquely threatens the existence of human freedom. This paper shows that this cannot be so. For, to uniquely threaten human freedom, infallible divine foreknowledge would have to make an essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. And infallible divine foreknowledge cannot do this. There remains, however, an important question about the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge. It is a (...) question not about the existence of foreknowledge, but about its mechanics. (shrink)

In a recent paper, William Hasker has responded to a paper of mine criticizing his argument for theological incompatibilism. In his response, Hasker makes a small but important amendment to his account of freedom. Here I argue that Hasker’s amended account of freedom is false, that there is a plausible alternative account of freedom, and that the plausibility of this alternative account shows that Hasker’s argument for theological incompatibilism relies on a dubious premise.

The plane was going to crash, but it didn't. Johnny was going to bleed to death, but he didn't. Geach sees here a changing future. In this paper, I develop Geach's primary argument for the (almost universally rejected) thesis that the future is mutable (an argument from the nature of prevention), respond to the most serious objections such a view faces, and consider how Geach's view bears on traditional debates concerning divine foreknowledge and human freedom. As I hope to show, (...) Geach's view constitutes a radically new view on the logic of future contingents, and deserves the status of a theoretical contender in these debates. (shrink)