Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?

Theoria 76 (3):197-206 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JOHDPE
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-07-01
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-08-11

Total views
208 ( #24,614 of 56,054 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #35,251 of 56,054 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.