Results for 'G.E. Moore'

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  1. G. E. Moore and Theory of Moral/Right Action in Ethics of Social Consequences.Vasil Gluchman - 2017 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 7 (1-2):57-65.
    G. E. Moore’s critical analysis of right action in utilitarian ethics and his consequentialist concept of right action is a starting point for a theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences. The terms right and wrong have different meanings in these theories. The author explores different aspects of right and wrong actions in ethics of social consequences and compares them with Moore’s ideas. He positively evaluates Moore’s contributions to the development his theory of moral/right action.
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  2.  70
    G. E. Moore and the Problem of the Criterion.Joshua Anderson - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1):53-60.
    In this paper, I offer an understanding of G.E. Moore’s epistemology as presented in, “A Defence of Common Sense” and “Proof of an External World”. To frame the discussion, I look to Roderick Chisholm’s essay, The Problem of the Criterion. I begin by looking at two ways that Chisholm believes one can respond to the problem of the criterion, and, referring back to Moore’s essays, explain why it is not unreasonable for Chisholm to believe that he is following (...)
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  3. G. E. Moore and the Greifswald Objectivists on the Given and the Beginning of Analytic Philosophy.Nikolay Milkov - 2004 - Axiomathes 14 (4):361-379.
    Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald (...)
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  4. Review of G.E.Moore’s Ethical Theory by Brian Hutchinson. [REVIEW]Charles Pigden - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly:543-547.
    The history of philosophy can be seen either as a contribution to history or a contribution to philosophy or perhaps as a bit of both. Hutchinson fail on both counts. The book is bad: bad in itself (since it quite definitely ought not to be) and bad as a companion to Principia (since it sets students a bad example of slapdash, lazy and pretentious philosophizing and would tend to put them off reading Moore). As a conscientious reviewer I ploughed (...)
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  5. Desiring to Desire: Russell, Lewis and G.E.Moore.Charles Pigden - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes from G.E.Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 244-260.
    I have two aims in this paper. In §§2-4 I contend that Moore has two arguments (not one) for the view that that ‘good’ denotes a non-natural property not to be identified with the naturalistic properties of science and common sense (or, for that matter, the more exotic properties posited by metaphysicians and theologians). The first argument, the Barren Tautology Argument (or the BTA), is derived, via Sidgwick, from a long tradition of anti-naturalist polemic. But the second argument, the (...)
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  6. On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-Psychologism in Nineteenth-Century Psychology and G.E. Moore’s Early Theory of Judgment.Consuelo Preti - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):176-185.
    I argue that the familiar picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and to some degree erroneous. Archival evidence suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, especially evident in his 1899 paper ‘The nature of judgment,’ comes from the literature in nineteenth-century empirical psychology rather than nineteenth-century neo-Hegelianism, as is widely believed. I argue that the conceptual influences of Moore’s paper are more likely to (...)
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  7. ‘He Was In Those Days Beautiful And Slim’: Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, 1894–1901.Consuelo Preti - 2008 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 28 (2).
    Moore and Russell’s philosophical and personal paths through the early years of the twentieth century make a fascinating chronicle. Some of this story is familiar; but material from the unpublished Moore papers adds new and forceful detail to the account. It is a commonplace by now that Russell and Moore were not friends, although they maintained a long professional association. Their most intellectually intimate phase came early on, reaching a peak in 1897–99. But I show that during (...)
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  8. Moore’s Notes on Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933: Text, Context, and Content.David G. Stern, Gabriel Citron & Brian Rogers - 2013 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review (1):161-179.
    Wittgenstein’s writings and lectures during the first half of the 1930s play a crucial role in any interpretation of the relationship between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations . G. E. Moore’s notes of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures, 1930-1933, offer us a remarkably careful and conscientious record of what Wittgenstein said at the time, and are much more detailed and reliable than previously published notes from those lectures. The co-authors are currently editing these notes of Wittgenstein’s lectures for a book (...)
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  9. Why Moore Matters.Adam Leite - manuscript
    G.E. Moore’s writings on external world skepticism show us, in broad outline, how to dispense with external world skepticism in a way that is satisfying, intellectually responsible, and yet avoids engaging in constructive epistemological theory-building altogether. His work thus reveals something very important about the relation between epistemology and ordinary life, and also about what it would take to reach a satisfying resolution of certain sorts of perennial philosophical problems.
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  10. Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value.Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.
    In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency (...)
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  11. Late Utilitarian Moral Theory and Its Development: Sidgwick, Moore.Anthony Skelton - 2019 - In J. A. Shand (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 281-310.
    Henry Sidgwick taught G.E. Moore as an undergraduate at the University of Cambridge. Moore found Sidgwick’s personality less than attractive and his lectures “rather dull”. Still, philosophically speaking, Moore absorbed a great deal from Sidgwick. In the Preface to the Trinity College Prize Fellowship dissertation that he submitted in 1898, just two years after graduation, he wrote “For my ethical views it will be obvious how much I owe to Prof. Sidgwick.” Later, in Principia Ethica, Moore (...)
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  12. Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World".Christopher Stratman - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers (...)
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  13. An Assumption of Extreme Significance: Moore, Ross and Spencer on Ethics and Evolution.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been a growing interest among mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers in the empirical study of human morality, including its evolution and historical development. This chapter compares these developments with an earlier point of contact between moral philosophy and the moral sciences in the early decades of the Twentieth century, as manifested in some of the less frequently discussed arguments of G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross. It is argued that a critical appreciation of (...) and Ross’s response to the emerging moral sciences of their day has significant implications for contemporary moral epistemology. The chapter also offers a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s ‘open question argument’. (shrink)
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  14.  26
    A Non-Dualistic Reply to Moore's Refutation of Idealism.R. E. Allinson - 1978 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (4):661-668.
    As a counter-argument to Moore's "Refutation of Idealism," this article explains how the application of non-dualistic idealism reveals the underlying problem in both narrowly defined "esse is principi" brands of idealism and Moore's realism. The issue at hand, this article suggests, is the presupposition that experience naturally forks off into subjective consciousness and particular objects of consciousness. Rather than agree with either Moore or dualistic forms of idealism, the Vedanta-inspired view set forth in this article provides a (...)
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  15. Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons From Moore and Parfit.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):87-107.
    The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection. (...)
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  16. Ideal Utilitarianism: Rashdall and Moore.Anthony Skelton - 2011 - In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press. pp. 45-65.
    Ideal utilitarianism states that the only fundamental requirement of morality is to promote a plurality of intrinsic goods. This paper critically evaluates Hastings Rashdall’s arguments for ideal utilitarianism, while comparing them with G. E. Moore’s arguments. Section I outlines Rashdall’s ethical outlook. Section II considers two different arguments that he provides for its theory of rightness. Section III discusses his defence of a pluralist theory of value. Section IV argues that Rashdall makes a lasting contribution to the defence of (...)
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  17. Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and Tolerable Revisionism: Lessons From Moore and Parfit.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico 212:49-57.
    My aim in this paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-based Reasons Model or the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then consider attempts to argue against the Model through its naturalism. I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is the indirect version of G. E. Moore’s (...)
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  18. Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: A Defense of Indefinability.Miles Tucker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2261-2276.
    Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and (...)
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  19. What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.
    I defend an account of Moore's conception of Common Sense—as it figures in "A Defence of Common Sense"—according to which it is based in a vision of the community of human beings as bound and unified by a settled common understanding of the meaning of our words and statements. This, for Moore, is our inalienable starting point in philosophy. When Moore invokes Common Sense against idealist (and skeptical) philosophers, he is reminding them that they too are bound (...)
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  20. Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism Vs Dancy's Variabilism.Guy Fletcher - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168.
    Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.
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  21.  11
    An Idealistic Reply To The Later Moore.Robert Allinson - 1980 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7 (3):375-379.
    This article is a response to the paradoxical nature of Moore's views on sense perception. By arguing that Moore's later stance on the objective world (that there are both mind-dependent and mind-independent features) requires a causal theory of perception, this article suggests that Moore lacks the epistemic justification needed to make assertions about the nature of mind-independent matter. Instead, the idealistic reply proposed in this article is to first dissolve Moore's distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent features (...)
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  22. Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics.N. G. Laskowski & Stephen Finlay - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 536-551.
    A critical survey of various positions on the nature, use, possession, and analysis of normative concepts. We frame our treatment around G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, and the ways metaethicists have responded by departing from a Classical Theory of concepts. In addition to the Classical Theory, we discuss synthetic naturalism, noncognitivism (expressivist and inferentialist), prototype theory, network theory, and empirical linguistic approaches. Although written for a general philosophical audience, we attempt to provide a new perspective and highlight some underappreciated (...)
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  23. Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox.John N. Williams - 2013 - Theoria 81 (1):27-47.
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart (...)
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  24. How to Read Moore's "Proof of an External World".Kevin Morris & Consuelo Preti - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (1).
    We develop a reading of Moore’s “Proof of an External World” that emphasizes the connections between this paper and Moore’s earlier concerns and strategies. Our reading has the benefit of explaining why the claims that Moore advances in “Proof of an External World” would have been of interest to him, and avoids attributing to him arguments that are either trivial or wildly unsuccessful. Part of the evidence for our view comes from unpublished drafts which, we believe, contain (...)
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  25. Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox.Michael Campbell - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):151-173.
    In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny the existence of irreducible and categorically normative epistemic reasons. My argument for the second of these claims exploits an analogy between the thesis that epistemic (...)
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  26.  22
    A FALÁCIA NATURALISTA E A DERIVAÇÃO DE SEARLE.Daniel Pires Nunes - 2022 - Perspectiva Filosófica 2 (49):133-147.
    In this article we intend to characterize the issue of the so-called naturalistic fallacy and to evaluate how John Searle approaches it. To do this, we will briefly approach the arguments of David Hume and G. E. Moore and then analyze how Searle's objections to the alleged fallacy relate to such approaches and if have been successful.
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  27. Might Anything Be Plain Good?Thomas Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3335-3346.
    G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is not a predicative adjective, but only ever an attributive adjective: just like ‘big.’ And just as there is no such thing as plain bigness but only ever big for or as a so-and-so, there is also no such thing as plain goodness. They conclude that Moore’s goodness is thus a nonsense. However attention (...)
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  28.  44
    How Pure Should Justice Be? Reflections on G. A. Cohen's Rhetorical Rescue.David Rondel - 2016 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 49 (3):323-342.
    In this article I argue for two closely related conclusions: one concerned more narrowly with the internal consistency of G. A. Cohen's theorizing about justice and the unique rhetoric in which it is couched, the other connected to a more sweeping set of recommendations about how theorizing on justice is most promisingly undertaken. First, drawing on a famous insight of G. E. Moore, I argue that although the purity of Cohenian justice provides Cohen a platform from which to put (...)
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  29. Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism.Tristram McPherson - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-25.
    G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsistency with alleged certainties, like the existence of his own hands. Recently, some philosophers have offered analogous arguments against revisionary views about ethics such as metaethical error theory. These arguments appeal to the inconsistency of error theory with seemingly obvious moral claims like “it is wrong to torture an innocent child just for fun.” It might seem that such ‘Moorean’ arguments in ethics will stand or fall (...)
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  30. War and Murder.G. E. M. Anscombe - unknown
    Two attitudes are possible: one, that the world is an absolute jungle and that the exercise of coercive power by rulers is only a manifestation of this; and the other, that it is both necessary and right that there should be this exercise of power, that through it the world is much less of a jungle than it could possibly be without it, so that one should in principle be glad of the existence of such power, and only take exception (...)
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  31.  73
    "Principia Ethica" Re-Examined: The Ethics of a Proto-Logical Atomism.Julius Kovesi - 1984 - Philosophy 59 (228):157 - 170.
    One of the questions that any future history of British moral philosophy in the twentieth century should investigate and document is how it came about that Moore's Principia Ethica was appropriated by what we can call the Humean tradition of moral philosophy. I shall not trace that development now but only argue that there was no excuse or justification for it.
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  32. Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.
    This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
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  33. Teória Správneho V Etike Sociálnych Dôsledkov.Vasil Gluchman - 2001 - Filosoficky Casopis 49:633-654.
    The paper develops the theory of right action in ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism.
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  34. On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy.Fraser MacBride - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of these (...)
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  35. Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or UnPhilosophical Moralist?Charles Pigden - 2003 - In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press. pp. 475-506.
    Until very recently the received wisdom on Russell’s moral philosophy was that it is uninspired and derivative, from Moore in its first phase and from Hume and the emotivists in its second. In my view this is a consensus of error. In the latter part of this essay I contend: 1) that Russell’s ‘work in moral philosophy’ had at least three, and (depending how you look at it) up to six ‘main phases’; 2) that in some of those phases, (...)
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  36. Reducing Reasons.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.
    Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can (...)
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  37.  45
    The theory of the good in the ethics of social consequences.V. Gluchman - 2001 - Filosoficky Casopis 49 (4):633-654.
    The paper explores the theory of right action in ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism.
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  38.  57
    Philosophy of Science in Practice in Ecological Model Building.Luana Poliseli, Jeferson G. E. Coutinho, Blandina Viana, Federica Russo & Charbel N. El-Hani - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (4):0-0.
    This article addresses the contributions of the literature on the new mechanistic philosophy of science for the scientific practice of model building in ecology. This is reflected in a one-to-one interdisciplinary collaboration between an ecologist and a philosopher of science during science-in-the-making. We argue that the identification, reconstruction and understanding of mechanisms is context-sensitive, and for this case study mechanistic modeling did not present a normative role but a heuristic one. We expect our study to provides useful epistemic tools for (...)
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  39.  74
    Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function.Voin Milevski - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):531-541.
    G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form ‘p, but I don’t believe that p’ are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say ‘Eliminativism is true, but of course I don’t believe it’s true’ sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri’s attempt misses the point entirely, for the most (...)
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  40. Simply Good: A Defence of the Principia.Miles Tucker - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (3):253-270.
    Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. (...)
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  41.  81
    Against ‘Good for’/‘Well-Being’, for ‘Simply Good’.Thomas Hurka - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):803-22.
    This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well-being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘good for’ expresses is (...)
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  42. Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans. Svoboda - 2011 - Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
    The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic value of some non-human from any set of (...)
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  43. Lotze and the Early Cambridge Analytic Philosophy.Nikolay Milkov - 2000 - Prima Philosophia 13:133-53.
    Many historians of analytic philosophy consider the early philosophy of Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as much more neo-Hegelian as once believed. At the same time, the authors who closely investigate Green, Bradley and Bosanquet find out that these have little in common with Hegel. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that what the British (ill-named) neo-Hegelians brought to the early analytic philosophers were, above all, some ideas of Lotze, not of Hegel. This is true regarding: (i) Lotze’s logical (...)
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  44. Las concepciones aristotélicas de la vida buena y la falacia naturalista [Aristotelian Conceptions of the Good Life and the Naturalistic Fallacy].Rocío Cázares Blanco - 2010 - Dianoia 55 (65):67-90.
    Aristotelian conceptions of the good life are often criticized from several ethical positions, like G.E. Moore’s anti-naturalism or emotivism and prescriptivism. Aristotelians are accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy when they make a moral evaluation of features, actions, intentions and faculties of human beings. In this paper, I examine and refute AlfonsoGómez-Lobo’s strategy to reject that accusation; then, I propose another strategy and I argue that inclusivist Aristotelian conceptions of the good life could be freed from such criticism if (...)
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  45. The First Nine Months of Editing Wittgenstein - Letters From G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees to G.H. Von Wright.Christian Eric Erbacher & Sophia Victoria Krebs - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):195-231.
    The National Library of Finland and the Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki keep the collected correspondence of Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein’s friend and successor at Cambridge and one of the three literary executors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Among von Wright’s correspondence partners, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees are of special interest to Wittgenstein scholars as the two other trustees of the Wittgenstein papers. Thus, von Wright’s collections held in Finland promise to shed light on the (...)
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  46. Pure Awareness Experience.Brentyn J. Ramm - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognizing pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because (...)
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  47. A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore?Tristram McPherson - 2016 - In Ben Bramble & Bob Fischer (eds.), The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 118-134.
    Philosophers have offered several apparently powerful arguments against the permissibility of eating meat. However, the idea that it is okay to eat meat can seem like a bit of ethical common sense. This paper examines the attempt to adapt one of the most influential philosophical defenses of common sense –G. E. Moore’s case against the skeptic andthe idealist –in support of the omnivore. I first introduce and explain Moore’s argument against the skeptic. I then explain how that argument (...)
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  48. Metaphysics, Mysticism and Russell.Alan Schwerin - 2002 - Contemporary Philosophy (1 & 2): 45 - 50.
    Towards the end of 1911, Russell complains that philosophy has unfortunately not produced a set of religious beliefs that he can rely on in his personal life. Early in his career philosophy had appeared very promising. But the adoption of G.E. Moores's philosophical views put paid to the "last hope of getting any creed out of philosophy". My paper is an attempt to show that Russell ought to celebrate, and not complain about the products of his philosophical endeavours. His correspondence (...)
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  49. Idealism and Common Sense.C. A. McIntosh - 2021 - In Joshua Farris & Benedikt Paul Göcke (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism. pp. 496-505.
    The question I wish to explore is this: Does idealism conflict with common sense? Unfortunately, the answer I give may seem like a rather banal one: It depends. What do we mean by ‘idealism’ and ‘common sense?’ I distinguish three main varieties of idealism: absolute idealism, Berkeleyan idealism, and dualistic idealism. After clarifying what is meant by common sense, I consider whether our three idealisms run afoul of it. The first does, but the latter two don’t. I conclude that while (...)
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  50. G. E. M. Anscombe: Aufsätze.Ulf Hlobil & Katharina Nieswandt (eds.) - 2014 - Suhrkamp.
    Die Wittgenstein-Schülerin Elizabeth Anscombe zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophinnen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mit der Monographie Absicht begründete sie die analytische Handlungstheorie, viele ihrer Abhandlungen gelten als Klassiker, aber nur wenige liegen bislang in deutscher Übersetzung vor. Der vorliegende Band füllt diese Lücke: Er versammelt zwölf von Anscombes wichtigsten Aufsätzen, die thematisch von der praktischen Philosophie über die Metaphysik und die Philosophie des Geistes bis hin zu Aristoteles- und Wittgenstein-Interpretationen reichen, also das ganze Spektrum ihres Denkens repräsentieren. Die Anmerkungen und Erläuterungen (...)
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