Morally, We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):817-821 (2015)
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In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way
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Counterfactuals.Lewis, David

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