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  1. Recasting Responsibility: Hume and Williams.Paul Russell - forthcoming - In Marcel van Ackeren & Matthieu Queloz (eds.), Bernard Williams on Philosophy and History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Bernard Williams identifies Hume as “in some ways an archetypal reconciler” who, nevertheless, displays “a striking resistance to some of the central tenets of what [Williams calls] ‘morality’”. This assessment, it is argued, is generally correct. There are, however, some significant points of difference in their views concerning moral responsibility. This includes Williams’s view that a naturalistic project of the kind that Hume pursues is of limited value when it comes to making sense of “morality’s” illusions about responsibility and blame. (...)
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  2. Apreciaciones de Hannah Arendt sobre la doctrina agustiniana de la libre elección de la voluntad.Lino Latella-Calderón - 2000 - Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Iberoamericana y Teoría Social 5 (10):77-85.
    Analizaremos someramente las apreciaciones de Arendt en la sección dedicada a la Voluntad de su obra La Vida del Espíritu, acerca de la doctrina agustiniana de la escisión de esta facultad en dos voluntades problemáticas y antagónicas, velle y nolle, escisión superada parcialmente por el autor mediante las doctrinas del amor y de la libertad humana originada en el principium del tiempo.
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  3. Concept of Fate among the Turks.Mehmet Karabela - 2021 - In Islamic Thought Through Protestant Eyes. New York: Routledge. pp. 161-177.
    German Lutheran scholar Johann Friedrich Weitenkampf (d.1758) sets out to explain and refute the Turkish concept of fate, dividing his dissertation into two sections: the first outlining the Turkish-Muslim view of fate; and the second seeking to prove the invalidity of the Muslim concept of fate with philosophical argumentation. He begins with some brief notes on the historical origin of the Turks, turning then to the backstory of the Qur’an, which he claims can be divided into six sections or topics, (...)
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  4. Manipulation, machine induction, and bypassing.Gabriel De Marco - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):487-507.
    A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typical agent in a deterministic universe, responsibility is (...)
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  5. How Consciousness Creates Reality. The Full Version.Claus Janew - 2022 - Charleston: CreateSpace.
    The main argument in this book is the undeniable openness of every system to the unknown. And the fundamental question goes: What does this openness produce? We are a part of the infinite universe and an incorporation of its wholeness. Both for us means an individualized reality, through which the universe expresses itself and on the other hand through which it is built up with. It also means our necessity, importance and indestructibility for the sum of its incorporations. Most connections (...)
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  6. Free Will and the Tragic Predicament: Making Sense of Williams.Paul Russell - 2022 - In Andras Szigeti & Matthew Talbert (eds.), Morality and Agency: Themes From Bernard Williams. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 163-183.
    Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams -/- The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” (...)
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  7. Free will? What’s that?Marco Masi - manuscript
    The question of whether we have free will is a longstanding philosophical debate that has led to divided fronts and interpretations. The first ambiguity arises due to a misconception about the relation between causal determinism, as formulated in classical physics, and the notion of free will, which, once clarified, undermines not only compatibilism but also naïve formulations of libertarianism. We show that either one maintains a material monistic physical causal determinism and must give up free will, or one must give (...)
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  8. The Free Agent, Luck, and Character.Zahra Khazaei - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):173-192.
    Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity. The present article, apart from possible alternatives and the causality of the agent regarding his actions, addresses the element of inclination as a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions determines that even though in some circumstances the range of alternatives the agent can choose is very (...)
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  9. Three Arguments from Science *for* Free Will.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    I give three brief scientifically informed arguments that free will is causally efficacious over-and-above the efficaciousness of its physical substrate. (This is a second attempt at putting it up on PhilPapers--there seems to have been some problem with downloading the previous version.).
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  10. Against Synchronic Free Will.Simon Kittle - 2022 - In Simon Kittle & Georg Gasser (eds.), The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives. New York: Routledge. pp. 176-194.
    In this chapter I argue that the necessity of the present counts against theories of synchronic free will, according to which a person may have free will at a time t0 even once that person has decided at t0 to do something. I defend the theory of diachronic free will against recent critiques drawn from the work of Michael Rota and Katherin Rogers. And I chart some of the implications for the philosophy of religion.
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  11. Me, My Will, and I: Kant's Republican Conception of Freedom of the Will and Freedom of the Agent.Pauline Kleingeld - 2020 - Studi Kantiani 33:103-123.
    Kant’s theory of freedom, in particular his claim that natural determinism is compatible with absolute freedom, is widely regarded as puzzling and incoherent. In this paper I argue that what Kant means by ‘freedom’ has been widely misunderstood. Kant uses the definition of freedom found in the republican tradition of political theory, according to which freedom is opposed to dependence, slavery, and related notions – not to determinism or to coercion. Discussing Kant’s accounts of freedom of the will and freedom (...)
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  12. Daniel Dennett’s and Sam Harris’ Confrontation on the Problem of Free Will.Zahra Khazaei, Nancey Murphy & Tayyebe Gholami - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 22 (2):27-48.
    This paper seeks to explain and evaluate, by an analytic method, the conflict between determinism and free will from the viewpoint of two physicalist reductionist philosophers, namely, Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris. Dennett is a compatibilist philosopher who tries to show compatibility between determinism and free will, while Sam Harris is a non-compatibilist philosopher who turns to determinism with the thesis that our thoughts and actions have been pre-determined by the neurobiological events associated with them, and thus, considers free will (...)
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  13. Freedom and Confinement in Modernity: Kafka’s Cages.Dimitris Vardoulakis & Kiarina Kordela (eds.) - 2011 - New York, NY, USA: Palgrave.
    Kafka's literary universe is organized around constellations of imprisonment. Freedom and Confinement in Modernity proposes that imprisonment does not signify a tortured state of the individual in modernity. Rather, it provides a new reading of imprisonment suggesting it allows Kafka to perform a critique of a modernity instead.
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  14. Carving a Life from Legacy: Frankfurt’s Account of Free Will and Manipulation in Greg Egan’s “Reasons to Be Cheerful”.Taylor W. Cyr - 2018 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 1:1-15.
    Many find it intuitive that having been manipulated undermines a person's free will. Some have objected to accounts of free will like Harry Frankfurt's (according to which free will depends only on an agent's psychological structure at the time of action) by arguing that it is possible for manipulated agents, who are intuitively unfree, to satisfy Frankfurt's allegedly sufficient conditions for freedom. Drawing resources from Greg Egan's "Reasons to Be Cheerful" as well as from stories of psychologically sophisticated artificial intelligence (...)
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  15. Moreau’s Law in The Island of Doctor Moreau in Light of Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis.Daniel Paul Dal Monte - 2018 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 1:1-12.
    In this paper, I explore a tension between the Law in the novel The Island of Doctor Moreau, by H. G. Wells, and Kant's reciprocity thesis. The Law is a series of prohibitions that Moreau has his beasts recite. Moreau devotes his time to transforming animals through a painful surgery into beings that resemble humans, but the humanized beasts are constantly slipping back into animalistic habits, and so Moreau promulgates the Law to maintain decorum. Kant's reciprocity thesis states that free (...)
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  16. Power and Agency. [REVIEW]Robert Allen - manuscript
    E.J. Lowe attempts to meld elements of volitionalism and agent causalism in his recent essay on philosophy of action, Personal Agency. United in the belief that our mental states are inefficacious when it comes to producing volitions, agent causalists disagree over just how to formulate an alternative understanding of mental agency. We exercise self-control so as to appropriate objects of reactive attitudes by being the ultimate sources of our behavior- here they concur. But the precise nature of the relation between (...)
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  17. The Problem of Determinism - Freedom as Self-Determination.Dieter Wandschneider - 2010 - Psychotherapie Forum 18:100-107.
    There are arguments for determinism. Admittedly, this is opposed by the fact of everyday experience of autonomy. In the following, it is argued for the compatibility of determinism and autonomy. Taking up considerations of Donald MacKay, a fatalistic attitude can be refuted as false. Repeatedly, attempts have been made to defend the possibility of autonomy with reference to quantum physical indeterminacy. But its statistical randomness clearly misses the meaning of autonomy. What is decisive, on the other hand, is the possibility (...)
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  18. Optimistic Molinism.Andre Leo Rusavuk - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):371-387.
    Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, concluding (...)
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  19. Free Will: Real or Illusion - A Debate.Gregg D. Caruso, Christian List & Cory J. Clark - 2020 - The Philosopher 108 (1).
    Debate on free will with Christian List, Gregg Caruso, and Cory Clark. The exchange is focused on Christian List's book Why Free Will Is Real.
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  20. To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.
    A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not (...)
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  21. Kant on Moral Agency: Beyond the Incorporation Thesis.Valtteri Viljanen - 2020 - Kant Studien 111 (3):423–444.
    This paper aims to discern the limits of the highly influential Incorporation Thesis to give proper weight to our sensuous side in Kant’s theory of moral action. I first examine the view of the faculties underpinning the theory, which allows me to outline the passage from natural to rational action. This enables me to designate the factors involved in actual human agency and thereby to show that, contrary to what the Incorporation Thesis may tempt one to believe, we do not (...)
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  22. Hegel.Christopher Yeomans - 2017 - In Kevin Timpe (ed.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 356-363.
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  23. Respuestas a los comentaristas.Carlos Moya - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1):127-147.
    Replies to commentators Respuestas a los comentarios críticos de Carlos Patarroyo, Mirja Pérez de Calleja y Pablo Rychter.
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  24. Sinopsis de "El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico".Carlos Moya - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1):83-89.
    Précis of El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico En este libro nos hemos planteado varios objetivos. En primer lugar, ofrecer al lector una guía o mapa que le oriente en el complejo territorio del debate sobre el libre albedrío. En segundo lugar, abogar por una determinada concepción del libre albedrío, a saber, el libertarismo, frente a otras posibles, en especial el compatibilismo. En tercer lugar, defender la existencia del libre albedrío frente a diversos desafíos, de tipos también diversos, que la (...)
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  25. Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.
    Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that free actions are a natural kind, by relying on the influential idea that kinds are homeostatic property clusters. The resulting position builds on the view that agents are a natural kind and yields an attractive alternative to recent revisionist accounts of free action. My view (...)
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  26. A Metaphysics For Freedom, by Steward Helen: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. xii + 267, £36.00. [REVIEW]Antony Eagle - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):833-833.
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  27. Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences.Jason D. Runyan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4563-4580.
    Agent-causal libertarians maintain we are irreducible agents who, by acting, settle matters that aren’t already settled. This implies that the neural matters underlying the exercise of our agency don’t conform to deterministic laws, but it does not appear to exclude the possibility that they conform to statistical laws. However, Pereboom (Noûs 29:21–45, 1995; Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; in: Nadelhoffer (ed) The future of punishment, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013) has argued that, if these neural (...)
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  28. El yo y la libertad: raíces patrísticas de la antropología renacentista y moderna.Francisco Bastitta-Harriet - 2012 - RIIM 56:35-56.
    Humanists and philosophers in the Quattrocento find inspiration for their treatises on human dignity not only in Classical Antiquity, but also in the works of the Church Fathers. The present paper examines the influence of the latter on the theories of freedom at the dawn of Modernity, especially regarding the Patristic conception of human self as person or hypostasis, whose free decision is considered inviolable, creative and irreducible to its own nature or essence.
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  29. Taking Responsibility for Ourselves: A Kierkegaardian Account of the Freedom-Relevant Conditions Necessary for the Cultivation of Character.Paul E. Carron - 2011 - Dissertation, Baylor University
    What are the freedom-relevant conditions necessary for someone to be a morally responsible person? I examine several key authors beginning with Harry Frankfurt that have contributed to this debate in recent years, and then look back to the writings or Søren Kierkegaard to provide a solution to the debate. In this project I investigate the claims of semi-compatibilism and argue that while its proponents have identified a fundamental question concerning free will and moral responsibility—namely, that the agential properties necessary for (...)
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  30. Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
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  31. Reply to Wiens.David Estlund - 2016 - European Journal of Political Theory 15 (3):353-362.
    In Human Nature and the Limits of Political Philosophy, I argued that justice might require things of people that they cannot bring themselves to do. A central step was to argue that this does not entail an inability to ‘do’ the putatively required thing. David Wiens challenges that argument of mine, and this piece is my reply.
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  32. Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do otherwise is (...)
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  33. Morally, We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky.Sean Johnson - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):817-821.
    In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way.
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  34. The Narrative of Moral Responsibility.Rodrigo Laera - 2014 - Philosophical Analysis 31:123-149.
    The goal of this paper is to suggest that theoretical thinking with respect to metaphysical determinations or indeterminations is not the appropriate realm for attributing moral responsibility. On the contrary, judgments that attribute moral responsibility (S is responsible for...) depend on the possibility that a rational narrative be built. Agents are capable of forging their future actions, as well as of reflecting upon past actions. With this it will also be shown how we assume control of our behavior because we (...)
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  35. On Free Will and No-conspiracy.Iñaki San Pedro - 2013 - In Tilman Sauer & Adrian Wüthrich (eds.), New Vistas on Old Problems: Recent Approaches to the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Max Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge. pp. 87-102.
    In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that Measurement Independence adequately represents the requirement that EPR experimenters have free will. Measurement Independence is most commonly taken as a necessary condition for free will. A number of implicit assumptions can be identified in this regard, all of which can be challenged on their own grounds. As a result, I conclude that Measurement Independence-type conditions are not to be justified by appealing to the preservation of the EPR experimenters’ free will.
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  36. A construção de mitos e os usos do passado nacional: Vargas e Perón: Brasil: Cultura-Memória.A. de Castro Gomes - 1997 - História 16:109-129.
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  37. A construção de mitos e os usos do passado nacional: Vargas e Perón.Angela de Castro Gomes - 1997 - História 16:109-130.
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  38. Freedom, determinism, and causality de Elliott Sober.Rodrigo Cid - 2010 - Filosofia Unisinos 11 (3):348-350.
    A primeira tese de Sober é que não podemos agir livremente, a não ser que o Argumento da Causalidade ou o Argumento da Inevitabilidade tenham alguma falha. O Argumento da Causalidade é o seguinte: nossos estados mentais causam movimentos corporais; mas nossos estados mentais são causados por fatores do mundo físico. Nossa personalidade pode ser reconduzida à nossa experiência e à nossa genética. E tanto a experiência quanto a genética foram causados por itens do mundo físico. Assim, o meio ambiente (...)
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  39. Determinism: Do Untutored Intuitions Feed the Bugbears?Dhar Sharmistha - 2009 - International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 2 (1):167-189.
    Philosophers have since long been relying on their own intuitions to shore up their own belief about agency and about the possibility of reconciliation with the domain of physical events that seems to be freewheeled by an underlying necessitarian process. In a certain philosophical circle, a trend has now emerged to put unprimed intuitions to test through psychological experiments, in order to figure out whether philosophers should exercise some temperance in bringing their own belief about agency to the fore, and (...)
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  40. Self-Determination and the Brain.Godehard Brüntrup - 2008 - Gregorianum 89 (4):816-831.
    The main topic of this paper will not be the notoriously difficult metaphysical question of freedom and determinism. An act of will is either determined by a causal chain of previous events or is a mere chance event. In either case there seems to be no room for freedom. This question is of such a high level of conceptual generality that it applies not only to human freedom but to any being that acts for reasons, even beings that lack a (...)
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  41. Free Will vs Natural Necessity?Stuart Greenstreet - 2012 - Philosophy Now 93:25-27.
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  42. Causes and (in)Determinism.Tomasz Placek, Jacek Wawer & Leszek Wroński - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):339-341.
    Introduction to a special issue of Erkenntnis.
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  43. Free Agents as Cause.Daniel von Wachter - 2003 - In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 183-194.
    The dilemma of free will is that if actions are caused deterministically, then they are not free, and if they are not caused deterministically then they are not free either because then they happen by chance and are not up to the agent. I propose a conception of free will that solves this dilemma. It can be called agent causation but it differs from what Chisholm and others have called so.
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  44. Spinoza's Ethics: Freedom and Determinism.Alfredo Lucero-Montaño - manuscript
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  45. Being Unfree to and Being Unfree.George E. Panichas - 1979 - Analysis 39 (1):61 - 63.
    This paper provides a criticism of J. P. Day's analysis (in "Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty," American Philosophical Quarterly, 14, 4 1977) of a person's being unfree to do or perform some act or other just in case that person is rendered retrievably unable to do so by the actions of another. Because Day contends that his analysis also applies to liberty, this criticism applies to that analysis as well.
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  46. Free will and the problem of evil.James Cain - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.
    According to the free-will defence, the exercise of free will by creatures is of such value that God is willing to allow the existence of evil which comes from the misuse of free will. A well-known objection holds that the exercise of free will is compatible with determinism and thus, if God exists, God could have predetermined exactly how the will would be exercised; God could even have predetermined that free will would be exercised sinlessly. Thus, it is held, the (...)
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Agent Causation
  1. "Free Will".Paul Russell - 1997 - In Don Garrett & Edward Barbanell (eds.), Encyclopedia of empiricism. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. pp. 107-111.
    FREE WILL. The problem of "free will" has generally been interpreted in modern times in terms of the question of whether or not moral freedom and responsibility are compatible with causality and determinism. Philosophers in the empiricist tradition have defended, with remarkable consistency, a compatibilist position on this issue. Moreover, most of the major figures of the empiricist tradition (i.e. Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, Schlick, and Ayer) are understood to have endorsed and contributed to a single, unified strategy on this (...)
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  2. Real Free Will.von Wachter Daniel - manuscript
    Many authors hold that we cannot have the kind of free will that we seem to have. This article spells out and defends that kind of free will. Most libertarians hold that a free action involves a probabilistic process at some stage. Like the compatibilists, I hold that this is not only not required for free will but even reduces or excludes freedom. But contrary to the compatibilist and contrary to most libertarians, I claim that free will requires that we (...)
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  3. Thing Causation.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - forthcoming - Noûs.
    According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I (...)
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  4. Conceptos budistas fundamentales - En el lenguaje actual (3rd edition).Roberto Thomas Arruda - 2023 - São Paulo: Terra à Vista - edición gratuita.
    Buda no construyó una religión; Estudió filosofía y ciencias. Fue el precursor del realismo científico, el psicoanálisis, la filosofía analítica, el existencialismo, el feminismo, la epistemología, la teoría y crítica del conocimiento, la psicología social, la psicología positiva, el conservacionismo ecológico y conceptos relacionados con la materia y la energía que sólo muy recientemente la física cuántica pudo demostrar. . Conocer adecuadamente qué es el budismo es fundamental para la formación y la cultura de cualquier persona que no quiera ser (...)
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