Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner Speech

Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):74-99 (2014)
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Abstract
In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects of explanation for both sides of the debate and argue that cognitive phenomenology defenders are in an overall advantageous position. We also propose an account of inner speech that differs from other influential explanations in some interesting respects.
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Archival date: 2014-04-02
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Philosophical Investigations.Wittgenstein, Ludwig

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