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  1. added 2020-03-21
    人类行为的逻辑结构.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas. NV USA: Reality Press.
    我的论点是,这里突出的故意表(理性、思想、思想、语言、个性等)或多或少地准确地描述了我们思考和行为的方式,因此它不包括仅仅是哲学和心理学,但一切(历史,文学,数学,政治等)。特别要注意,故意和理性,因 为我(连同西尔,维特根斯坦和其他人)认为它,包括有意识的审议语言系统2和无意识的自动前语言系统1的动作或反射。 我提供了一个关键的调查,两个最杰出的学生的行为在现代的一些主要发现, 路德维希·维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔,关于故意的逻辑结构(思想、语言、行为),以维特根斯坦的基本发现为出发点——所有真正的"哲学"问题都是一样的——关于在特定上下文中使用语言的困惑,因 此所有解决方案都是相同的——研究如何在问题语境中使用语言,使其真理条件(满意条件或 COS) 是明确的。基本问题是,一个人可以说什么,但一个人不能意味着(状态明确的COS)任何任意的话语和意义只有在非常具体的上下文中才可能。我从现代两种思想体系(被推广为"思维快,思维慢") 的角度分析各种著作,采用新的意向表和新的双系统命名法。我表明,这是一个强大的启发式描述行为。 因此,如果一个人采取正确的观点,所有行为都是密切相关的。现象幻象(遗忘我们的自动化系统1)是通用的,不仅延伸到整个哲学,而且贯穿整个生命。我确信,如果乔姆斯基、奥巴马、扎克伯格和教皇被告知他们患有与黑 格尔、胡塞尔和海德格尔同样的问题,他们将会难以置信(或者,他们只与毒品和性瘾君子在程度上有所不同,他们的动机是通过心室和核积体来刺激他们的前皮质(和其他100种化学品),这显然是事实。虽然现象学家只浪 费了很多人的时间,但他们却在浪费地球和他们后代的未来。 .
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  2. added 2020-02-18
    A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heurista para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-13
    A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heurista para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema (...)
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  4. added 2019-12-04
    Fore- and Background in Conscious Non-Demonstrative Inference.Anders Nes - 2020 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 199-228.
    It is often supposed one can draw a distinction, among the assumptions on which an inference rests, between certain background assumptions and certain more salient, or foregrounded, assumptions. Yet what may such a fore-v-background structure, or such structures, consist it? In particular, how do they relate to consciousness? According to a ‘Boring View’, such structures can be captured by specifying, for the various assumptions of the inference, whether they are phenomenally conscious, or access conscious, or else how easily available they (...)
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  5. added 2019-09-10
    Why Does the Mind Wander?Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - Neuroscience of Consciousness.
    I seek an explanation for the etiology and the function of mind wandering episodes. My proposal – which I call the cognitive control proposal – is that mind wandering is a form of non-conscious guidance due to cognitive control. When the agent’s current goal is deemed insufficiently rewarding, the cognitive control system initiates a search for a new, more rewarding goal. This search is the process of unintentional mind wandering. After developing the proposal, and relating it to literature on mind (...)
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  6. added 2019-07-22
    Acts of Desire.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Act-based theories of content hold that propositions are identical to acts of predication that we perform in thought and talk. To undergo an occurrent thought with a particular content just is to perform the act of predication that individuates that content. But identifying the content of a thought with the performance of an act of predication makes it difficult to explain the intentionality of bouletic mental activity, like wanting and desiring. In this paper, I argue that this difficulty is insurmountable: (...)
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  7. added 2019-02-13
    Phenomenal Contrast Arguments: What They Achieve.Marta Jorba & Agustín Vicente - 2019 - Mind and Language:1-18.
    Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) experience, that certain contents are represented in experience and that kinds of sui generis phenomenologies such as cognitive phenomenology exist. In this paper we examine a neglected aspect of such arguments, i.e., the kind of mental episodes involved in them, and argue that this happens to be a crucial feature of the arguments. We use linguistic tools to determine the (...)
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  8. added 2018-10-05
    The Sense of Ego-Maker in Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: Reconsideration of ‘Ahaṃkāra’ with Reference to the Mind-Body Problem.Jakubczak Marzenna - 2013 - In Girishwar Misra (ed.), Psychology & Psychoanalysis. History of Science, Philosophy. New Delhi: Munshiram Monoharlal. pp. 291-308.
    While elucidating the sense of ego-maker in classical Samkhya and Yoga philosophy I bear in mind several meanings of the word ‘sense’, or different levels of its understanding, namely: the semantic, ontological and epistemic as well as axiological sense. Thus, my aim is, firstly, to specify the semantic sense of the term ‘ahamkara’, that is to explain its contents or denotation. Secondly, when focusing on the ontological context I will try to define the nature and reason, or purpose (arthavattava), of (...)
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  9. added 2018-07-25
    Phenomenal Dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.
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  10. added 2018-07-01
    Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
    I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine’s works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers’ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation—a configuration of objects and properties—verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to (...)
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  11. added 2018-06-21
    Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
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  12. added 2018-05-29
    Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.
    While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...)
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  13. added 2018-05-13
    Nonhuman Self-Investment Value.Gary Comstock - manuscript
    Guardians of companion animals killed wrongfully in the U.S. historically receive compensatory judgments reflecting the animal’s economic value. As animals are property in torts law, this value typically is the animal’s fair market value—which is often zero. But this is only the animal’s value, as it were, to a stranger and, in light of the fact that many guardians value their animals at rates far in excess of fair market value, legislatures and courts have begun to recognize a second value, (...)
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  14. added 2018-02-24
    On Experiencing Meaning: Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and Sinewave Speech.John Joseph Dorsch - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:218-227.
    Upon first hearing sinewaves, all that can be discerned are beeps and whistles. But after hearing the original speech, the beeps and whistles sound like speech. The difference between these two episodes undoubtedly involves an alteration in phenomenal character. O’Callaghan (2011) argues that this alteration is non-sensory, but he leaves open the possibility of attributing it to some other source, e.g. cognition. I discuss whether the alteration in phenomenal character involved in sinewave speech provides evidence for cognitive phenomenology. I defend (...)
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  15. added 2018-01-10
    From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustin Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    To some it is a shallow platitude that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component. To others, it is an empirical hypothesis with accumulating support. To yet others it is a false dogma. In this chapter, I defend the claim that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component, confining the claim to adults with ordinary speech and hearing. It is one thing, I emphasize, to assert that inner speech often, or even typically, has an auditory-phonological component—quite another to propose that (...)
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  16. added 2018-01-10
    Metacognitive Deficits in Categorization Tasks in a Population with Impaired Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan, Christopher Gauker, Michael J. Richardson, Aimee Deitz & Frank F. Faries - 2017 - Acta Psychologica 181:62-74.
    This study examines the relation of language use to a person’s ability to perform categorization tasks and to assess their own abilities in those categorization tasks. A silent rhyming task was used to confirm that a group of people with post-stroke aphasia (PWA) had corresponding covert language production (or “inner speech”) impairments. The performance of the PWA was then compared to that of age- and education-matched healthy controls on three kinds of categorization tasks and on metacognitive self-assessments of their performance (...)
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  17. added 2017-11-01
    The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents.Agustín Vicente & Marta Jorba - 2017 - Noûs (3):737-759.
    In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present (...)
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  18. added 2017-09-19
    Inner Speech Deficits in People with Aphasia.Peter Langland-Hassan, Frank R. Faries, Michael J. Richardson & Aimee Dietz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-10.
    Despite the ubiquity of inner speech in our mental lives, methods for objectively assessing inner speech capacities remain underdeveloped. The most common means of assessing inner speech is to present participants with tasks requiring them to silently judge whether two words rhyme. We developed a version of this task to assess the inner speech of a population of patients with aphasia and corresponding language production deficits. As expected, patients’ performance on the silent rhyming task was severely impaired relative to controls. (...)
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  19. added 2017-07-21
    Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and the AHA! Experience.John Joseph Dorsch - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 10:108-121.
    Elijah Chudnoff’s case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology hinges on seeming to see the truth of a mathematical proposition (Chudnoff 2015). In the following, I develop an augmented version of Chudnoff’s case, not based on seeming to see, or intuition, but based on being in a state with presentational phenomenology of high-level content. In contrast to other cases for cognitive phenomenology, those based on Strawson’s case (Strawson 2011), I argue that the case presented here is able to withstand counterarguments, which attempt (...)
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  20. added 2017-05-18
    The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.
    If there is content that we reason on, cognitive content, it is in the head and accessible to reasoning mechanisms. This paper discusses the phenomenal theory of cognitive content, according to which cognitive contents are the contents of phenomenal consciousness. I begin by distinguishing cognitive content from the closely associated notion of narrow content. I then argue, drawing on prior work, that the phenomenal theory can plausibly account for the cognitive contents of many relatively simple mental states. My main focus (...)
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  21. added 2017-03-27
    The Neuroscience of Spontaneous Thought: An Evolving, Interdisciplinary Field.Andrews-Hanna Jessica, Irving Zachary C., Fox Kieran, Spreng Nathan R. & Christoff Kalina - forthcoming - In Fox Kieran & Christoff Kieran (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought and Creativity. Oxford University Press.
    An often-overlooked characteristic of the human mind is its propensity to wander. Despite growing interest in the science of mind-wandering, most studies operationalize mind-wandering by its task-unrelated contents. But these contents may be orthogonal to the processes that determine how thoughts unfold over time, remaining stable or wandering from one topic to another. In this chapter, we emphasize the importance of incorporating such processes into current definitions of mind-wandering, and propose that mind-wandering and other forms of spontaneous thought (such as (...)
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  22. added 2017-03-27
    The Philosophy of Mind Wandering.Irving Zachary & Thompson Evan - forthcoming - In Fox Kieran & Christoff Kalina (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought and Creativity. Oxford University Press.
    Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begin with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated or stimulus-independent. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto centre stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations that researchers must overcome to move forward. Specifically, the standard definitions do not account for (i) the dynamics of mind wandering, (ii) task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mind-wandering, (...)
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  23. added 2017-03-14
    Far-Persons.Gary Comstock - 2017 - In Andrew Woodhall & Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade (eds.), Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 39-71.
    I argue for the moral relevance of a category of individuals I characterize as far-persons. Following Gary Varner, I distinguish near-persons, animals with a " robust autonoetic consciousness " but lacking an adult human's " biographical sense of self, " from the merely sentient, those animals living "entirely in the present." I note the possibility of a third class. Far-persons lack a biographical sense of self, possess a weak autonoetic consciousness, and are able to travel mentally through time a distance (...)
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  24. added 2017-03-06
    Hearing a Voice as One’s Own: Two Views of Inner Speech Self-Monitoring Deficits in Schizophrenia.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):675-699.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to explain experiences of auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia in terms of a failure on the part of patients to appropriately monitor their own inner speech. These self-monitoring accounts have recently been challenged by some who argue that AVHs are better explained in terms of the spontaneous activation of auditory-verbal representations. This paper defends two kinds of self-monitoring approach against the spontaneous activation account. The defense requires first making some important clarifications (...)
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  25. added 2017-02-11
    Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition.Philip Woodward - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind (10):140-155.
    Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property clusters (...)
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  26. added 2017-01-27
    Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...)
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  27. added 2016-12-19
    The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):312-335.
    We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this “inner life” of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, language expresses thought. Thus it would seem that thought must be independent of, and in some sense prior to, the speech that expresses it. (...)
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  28. added 2016-11-21
    Phenomenology of the Implicit.Steven Bartlett - 1975 - Dialectica 29 (2‐3):173-188.
    This paper marks a juncture between the author’s studies in phenomenology and the transition he made to a study of what he has called a “metalogic of reference.” Published in 1974 in Polish translation, followed by its publication in English in 1975, “Phenomenology of the Implicit” describes the author’s “translation schema” that permits certain of the central goals of Husserlian transcendental philosophy to be transposed to a framework that studies the preconditions of valid reference. The result of this translation was (...)
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  29. added 2016-06-13
    A Master Wittgensteinian Surveys Human Nature--A Review of Peter Hacker 'Human Nature-the Categorial Framework' (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order (...)
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  30. added 2016-06-13
    The Most Profound Spiritual Autobiography of All Time?- a Review of "The Knee of Listening" by Adi Da (Franklin Jones).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says `The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest ones. Certainly it is by far the fullest and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I (...)
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  31. added 2016-05-13
    The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination.Fabian Dorsch - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):114-137.
    The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, (...)
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  32. added 2016-05-13
    Conceptual Qualia and Communication.Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati - 2005 - In Gilian Crampton Smith (ed.), The Foundations of Interaction Design. pp. 1-14.
    The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
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  33. added 2016-04-17
    Transcendental Philosophy and Mind-Body Reductionism.Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2008 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 16:390-392.
    The notion of “representation” is central to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. But naturalism and mind-body reductionism tend to reduce talk of (first-person) representation to stories of (third-person) causality and evolution. How does Kant fare in this context?
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  34. added 2016-04-16
    Does Thought Happen in the Brain?Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2013 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 21:453-455.
    What is the nature of thought? Is thought linguistic and some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some kind of association of ideas and images in the mind? Does it happen in the brain? I will focus on the last question, but also say something about the other two. I will present a simple thought experiment to show that thought must somehow happen in the brain. But then I will soften the impression this might give by pointing (...)
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  35. added 2016-03-28
    I'm Thinking Your Thoughts While I Sleep: Sense of Agency and Ownership Over Dream Thought.Melanie Rosen - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):326-339.
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  36. added 2016-03-18
    Cognitive Extension, Enhancement, and the Phenomenology of Thinking.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):33-51.
    This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension. First, I explain the idea of cognitive extension, the metaphysics of mind on which it depends, and how it has figured in recent discussions of cognitive enhancement. Then, I develop ideas from Husserl that emphasize the agential character of thought and the distinctive way that conscious thoughts are related (...)
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  37. added 2016-01-12
    Conscious Thought and the Limits of Restrictivism.Marta Jorba - 2015 - Critica 47 (141):3-32.
    How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents. Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed by Restrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying states. On (...)
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  38. added 2016-01-11
    Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism About Phenomenal Properties.Tom McClelland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (264):536-558.
    Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it’s like to perceive some high-level property, and what it’s like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear ‘gappy’. The classic tests for ‘gappiness’ are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest that these tests yield conflicting results: non-sensory (...)
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  39. added 2015-02-15
    The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
    This is the first in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
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  40. added 2015-01-20
    The Sense of Natural Meaning in Conscious Inference.Anders Nes - 2016 - In T. Breyer & C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking. Routledge. pp. 97-115.
    The paper addresses the phenomenology of inference. It proposes that the conscious character of conscious inferences is partly constituted by a sense of meaning; specifically, a sense of what Grice called ‘natural meaning’. In consciously drawing the (outright, categorical) conclusion that Q from a presumed fact that P, one senses the presumed fact that P as meaning that Q, where ‘meaning that’ expresses natural meaning. This sense of natural meaning is phenomenologically analogous, I suggest, to our sense of what is (...)
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  41. added 2014-11-02
    Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.
    According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant (...)
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  42. added 2014-08-26
    Review of T. Bayne and M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: OUP, 2011. [REVIEW]Anders Nes - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):607-612.
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  43. added 2014-07-03
    The Meanings of Metacognition.Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):710-718.
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  44. added 2014-04-02
    Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner Speech.Marta Jorba & Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):74-99.
    In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects (...)
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  45. added 2014-04-02
    Realism and Anti-Realism About Experiences of Understanding.Jordan Dodd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):745-767.
    Strawson (1994) and Peacocke (1992) introduced thought experiments that show that it seems intuitive that there is, in some way, an experiential character to mental events of understanding. Some (e.g., Siewert 1998, 2011; Pitt 2004) try to explain these intuitions by saying that just as we have, say, headache experiences and visual experiences of blueness, so too we have experiences of understanding. Others (e.g., Prinz 2006, 2011; Tye 1996) propose that these intuitions can be explained without positing experiences of understanding. (...)
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  46. added 2014-02-16
    Cognitive-Phenomenological Penetration.Marius Dumitru - 2014 - Hypothesis 1 (1).
    The study of the mind has to grapple with both the unconscious and the conscious. While the phenomenon of cognitive penetration has already been explored especially in connection to the modularity of perceptual and cognitive processes, the phenomenon of cognitive-phenomenological penetration, the penetration within the stream of consciousness of the phenomenological fabric of experiences by the phenomenology of thought, has not been given much attention thus far. In this paper, I focus with analytic-phenomenological methods on cognitive-phenomenological penetration as a phenomenon (...)
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  47. added 2014-02-10
    Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge.Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):219-241.
    Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this paper (...)
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  48. added 2014-02-05
    Studied Abroad for 400 Years: Oliva Sabuco's New Philosophy of Human Nature.Mary Ellen Waithe - manuscript
    Oliva Sabuco's New Philosophy of Human nature (1587) is an early modern philosophy of medicine that challenged the views of the successors to Aristotle, especially Galen and Ibn Sina (Avicenna). It also challenged the paradigm of the male as the epitome of the human and instead offers a gender-neutral philosophy of human nature. Now largely forgotten, it was widely read and influential amongst philosophers of medicine including DeClave, LePois, Harvey,Southey and others, particularly for its account of the role of the (...)
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  49. added 2013-12-27
    A Modern Scientific Awareness of Upanishadic Wisdom: Implications to Physiological Psychology and Artificial Intelligence.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - 2004 - In In the Proceedings of World Congress on Vedic Sciences, 09-13 August 2004, Bangalore. pp. 562-568.
    Upanishads are traditionally commented upon as texts of theology and religion. But the contents of the Upanishads can also be viewed and commented from modern science point of view. Elements of modern science present in the Upanishads and Advaita Siddhanta will be listed. -/- The nature of maya will be discussed with modern scientific awareness. This awareness will be further used in understanding human mental processes and the ways to model them contributing to the natural language comprehension field of artificial (...)
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  50. added 2013-12-25
    THE PHYSICOCHEMICAL NATURE OF THOUGHTS AND IDEAS: AN ANCIENT INDIAN INSIGHT.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - 2009 - In Proceedings of the Third Vedic Science Conferenceon Chemical Sciences and Technology in Ancient Indiaheld at Bangalore on 23rd, 24th&25th, January, 2009 by National Institute of Vedic Sciences, Bangalore.
    The concept developed in relation to Atman as infrasonic bio-mechanical oscillatorwill be used to delineate the physicochemical nature of thoughts and ideas. The insight available in the Upanishads, the Brahma Sutras, the Vishnu Sahasranaama and LalitaSahasranaama will be used to further and advance the understanding of mechanical, biochemical and electro-chemical nature of human thoughts and ideas. The conceptual clarity about these mental processes will be presented. A pictorial diagram of nature and forms of energy transformations involved in thought processes and (...)
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