The Social Impact Theory of Law

Phenomenology and Mind 9:130-137 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1). Herein I argue that Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem of legal normativity is well motivated. Further, I argue that Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and more specifically obligations of joint commitment, allows us to move beyond the problem of legal normativity while cashing out H.L.A. Hart’s thesis that moral and legal obligations are distinct.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JOSTSI
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-03-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-03-17

Total views
140 ( #30,927 of 54,612 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #45,768 of 54,612 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.