Contents
68 found
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  1. Issues with the Judicial System: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach.Manish Nagireddy - manuscript
    What factors affect judicial decision-making? The legal system is of utmost importance because of its impact on our lives. Judges appear to have the most power among any social workers seeing as the precedents set in their decisions are tantamount to written law. Nevertheless, judges may be subject to certain biases, moral and cognitive alike, which influence their rulings. Looking into how morality and cognitive biases affect judges may also reveal how we as individuals handle combining morals with ethics- as (...)
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  2. Practical Reasons and interpretation of Customary International Law.Kostiantyn Gorobets - forthcoming - In Panos Merkouris, Jörg Kammerhofer & Noora Arjärvi (eds.), The Theory and Philosophy of Customary International Law and its Interpretation.
    When we say that we interpret customary international law, what is this thing that we actually interpret? Depending on how we answer this question, our view on interpretative methodology will change. It seems that the most promising approach is to say that interpretation of customary international law is an interpretation of certain legal practices. However, here we also encounter some problems. The dominant doctrine of customary international law requiring state practice and opinio juris assumes that only by adding a psychological (...)
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  3. On Law as Poetry: Shelley and Tocqueville.Joshua M. Hall - forthcoming - South African Journal of Philosophy 3 (40).
    Consonant with the ongoing “aesthetic turn” in legal scholarship, this article pursues a new conception of law as poetry. Gestures in this law-as-poetry direction appear in all three main schools in the philosophy of law’s history, as follows. First, natural law sees law as divinely-inspired prophetic poetry. Second, positive law sees the law as a creative human positing (from poetry’s poesis). And third, critical legal theory sees these posited laws as calcified prose prisons, vulnerable to poetic liberation. My first two (...)
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  4. Regulative Rules: A Distinctive Normative Kind.Reiland Indrek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What are rules? In this paper I develop a view of regulative rules which takes them to be a distinctive normative kind occupying a middle ground between orders and normative truths. The paradigmatic cases of regulative rules that I’m interested in are social rules like rules of etiquette and legal rules like traffic rules. On the view I’ll propose, a rule is a general normative content that is in force due to human activity: enactment by an authority or acceptance by (...)
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  5. Police Deception and Dishonesty – The Logic of Lying.Luke William Hunt - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Cooperative relations steeped in honesty and good faith are a necessity for any viable society. This is especially relevant to the police institution because the police are entrusted to promote justice and security. Despite the necessity of societal honesty and good faith, the police institution has embraced deception, dishonesty, and bad faith as tools of the trade for providing security. In fact, it seems that providing security is impossible without using deception and dishonesty during interrogations, undercover operations, pretextual detentions, and (...)
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  6. Legal Positivism and the Moral Origins of Legal Systems.Emad H. Atiq - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 36 (1):37-64.
    Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory options, I suggest (...)
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  7. The Official Story of the Law.William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs - 2023 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43 (1):178-201.
    A legal system’s ‘official story’ is its shared account of the law’s structure and sources, which members of its legal community publicly advance and defend. In some societies, however, officials pay lip service to this shared account, while privately adhering to their own unofficial story instead. If the officials enforce some novel legal code while claiming fidelity to older doctrines, then which set of rules—if either—is the law? We defend the legal relevance of the official story, on largely Hartian grounds. (...)
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  8. Introduction.Miroslav Imbrisevic - 2023 - In Miroslav Imbrišević (ed.), Sport, Law and Philosophy: The Jurisprudence of Sport. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Most people will not be familiar with the term ‘jurisprudence of sport’ (JOS). The idea is that looking at sport through the eyes of a legal scholar might illuminate our understanding of certain problems in sport (and vice versa). The term was first introduced in 2011, in the title of a paper by Mitchell N. Berman, who is also a contributor to this book. In the present volume we have contributions from around the world: Italy, Spain, Germany, Australia, Great Britain, (...)
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  9. The Second-Class Citizen in Legal Theory.Jack Samuel - 2023 - Modern Law Review.
    This essay is a critical notice of David Dyzenhaus's book, The Long Arc of Legality. I argue that Dyzenhaus’s criterion for distinguishing legal pathologies that undermine law's contractarian claim to legitimacy and political pathologies that do not is unsustainable. It relies on a categorical distinction between the threat to law's legitimacy posed by treating some subjects as de jure second-class citizens, whose formal legal status is compromised, and other threats to political legitimacy grounded in the treatment of some subjects as (...)
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  10. Metafísica para Juristas.Samuele Chilovi - 2022 - In Guillermo Lariguet & D. Lagier (eds.), Filosofía para Juristas. Una Introducción.
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  11. The Separability Thesis: A Comparison Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism.Owen Jeffrey Crocker - 2022 - Sophia: Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):60-71.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the separability of law and morality within an analytic jurisprudential framework. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the separability thesis will be discussed and defined. Second, Hart’s legal positivist account of law will be presented, which defends the separability thesis. Third, two objections from a natural law perspective (classical and contemporary) will be proposed against the legal positivist position, thereby rejecting the separability thesis. Each objection will be accompanied by a (...)
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  12. What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?Daniel J. Hill, Stephen K. McLeod & Attila Tanyi - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (1):47-73.
    Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts (...)
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  13. The Disunity of Legal Reality.David Plunkett & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Legal Theory 28 (3):235-267.
    Take “legal reality” to be the part of reality that actual legal thought and talk is dis- tinctively about, such as legal institutions, legal obligations, and legal norms. Our goal is to explore whether legal reality is disunified. To illustrate the issue, consider the possibility that an important metaphysical thesis such as positivism is true of one part of legal reality (legal institutions), but not another (legal norms). We offer two arguments that suggest that legal reality is disunified: one concerns (...)
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  14. La autoridad de Eugenio Bulygin.Julieta A. Rabanos - 2022 - In J. A. Rabanos (ed.), Eugenio Bulygin en la Teoría del Derecho contemporánea, vol. II. pp. 387-405.
    El presente trabajo propone hacer un análisis de la noción de autoridad en el marco de la teoría del derecho de Bulygin, particularmente en conexión con sus nociones de derecho y de interpretación. La intención es doble: por un lado, intentar articular sistemáticamente el pensamiento de Bulygin en relación con estas tres nociones, reconstruyendo un posible modo en el cual éstas se relacionan entre sí en el marco de su teoría del derecho (sección 2). Por el otro, proponer algunas perplejidades (...)
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  15. There are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-positivism.Emad H. Atiq - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (1).
    Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive (...)
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  16. The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law.Hrafn Ásgeirsson - 2020 - Oxford: Hart Publishing.
    Sample chapter from H. Asgeirsson, The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law (Hart Publishing, 2020), in which I present and partially defend a version of what has come to be called the communicative-content theory of law. Book abstract: Lawmaking is – paradigmatically – a type of speech act: people make law by saying things. It is natural to think, therefore, that the content of the law is determined by what lawmakers communicate. However, what they communicate is sometimes vague (...)
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  17. Disagreement about the kind law.Muhammad Ali Khalidi & Liam Murphy - 2020 - Jurisprudence 12 (1):1-16.
    This paper argues that the disagreement between positivists and nonpositivists about law is substantive rather than merely verbal, but that the depth and persistence of the disagreement about law, unlike for the case of morality, threatens skepticism about law. The range of considerations that can be brought to bear to help resolve moral disagreements is broader than is the case for law, thus improving the prospects of reconciliation in morality. But the central argument of the paper is that law, unlike (...)
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  18. The Social Construction of Legal Norms.Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 179-208.
    Legal norms are an invention. This paper advances a proposal about what kind of invention they are. The proposal is that legal norms derive from rules which specify role functions in a legal system. Legal rules attach to agents in virtue of their status within the system in which the rules operate. The point of legal rules or a legal system is to solve to large scale coordination problems, specifically the problem of organizing social and economic life among a group (...)
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  19. Hobbes’s third jurisprudence: legal pragmatism and the dualist menace.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1).
    This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue (...)
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  20. Of layers and lawyers.Michael Schmitz - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 221-240.
    How can the law be characterized in a theory of collective intentionality that treats collective intentionality as essentially layered and tries to understand these layers in terms of the structure and the format of the representations involved? And can such a theory of collective intentionality open up new perspectives on the law and shed new light on traditional questions of legal philosophy? As a philosopher of collective intentionality who is new to legal philosophy, I want to begin exploring these questions (...)
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  21. A new interpretivist metasemantics for fundamental legal disagreements.François Schroeter, Laura Schroeter & Kevin Toh - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (1):62-99.
    ABSTRACTWhat does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what would best serve the core purposes of (...)
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  22. Grounding Originalism.William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs - 2019 - Northwestern University Law Review 113.
    How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since. Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, (...)
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  23. Interpreting the Claim to Legitimate Authority: an Analysis of Joseph Raz's Objection Against Incorporating Moral Norms into Law.Ramiro Ávila Peres - 2019 - Ethic@: An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 18 (3):319–332.
    From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued by exclusive positivists, such as J. Raz. After presenting his argument in second section, we argue in the third section that it is incompatible with commonly accepted (even by Raz) premises of the theory of legal interpretation, or else it would lead to contradiction - unless one presupposes, within the premises, a strong version (...)
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  24. Robust Normativity, Morality, and Legal Positivism.David Plunkett - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 105-136.
    This chapter discusses two different issues about the relationship between legal positivism and robust normativity (understood as the most authoritative kind of normativity to which we appeal). First, the chapter argues that, in many contexts when discussing “legal positivism” and “legal antipositivism”, the discussion should be shifted from whether legal facts are ultimately partly grounded in moral facts to whether they are ultimately partly grounded in robustly normative facts. Second, the chapter explores an important difference within the kinds of arguments (...)
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  25. Laws as Conventional Norms.Nicholas Southwood - 2019 - In David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro & Kevin Toh (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    A persistent worry concerning conventionalist accounts of law is that such accounts are ill equipped to account for law’s special normativity. I offer a particular kind of conventionalist account that is based on the practice-dependent account of conventional norms I have offered elsewhere and consider whether it is vulnerable to the Normativity Objection. I argue that it isn’t. It can account for all the ways in which law can justly claim to be normative. While there are ways of being normative (...)
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  26. Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.
    Speech and thought about what the law is commonly function in practical ways, to guide or assess behavior. These functions have often been seen as problematic for legal positivism in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart. One recent response is to advance an expressivist analysis of legal statements (Toh), which faces its own, familiar problems. This paper advances a rival, positivist-friendly account of legal statements which we call “quasi-expressivist”, explicitly modeled after Finlay’s metaethical theory of moral statements. This consists in a (...)
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  27. Preface to a Philosophy of Legal Information.Kevin Lee - 2018 - SMU Science and Technology Law Review 20.
    This essay introduces the philosophy of legal information (PLI), which is a response to the radical changes brought about in philosophy by the information revolution. It reviews in some detail the work of Luciano Floridi, who is an influential advocate for an information turn in philosophy that he calls the philosophy of information (PI). Floridi proposes that philosophers investigate the conceptual nature of information as it currently exists across multiple disciplines. He shows how a focus on the informational nature of (...)
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  28. Attitude and the normativity of law.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (5):469-493.
    Though legal positivism remains popular, HLA Hart’s version has fallen somewhat by the wayside. This is because, according to many, the central task of a theory of law is to explain the so-called ‘normativity of law’. Hart’s theory, it is thought, is not up to the task. Some have suggested modifying the theory accordingly. This paper argues that both Hart’s theory and the normativity of law have been misunderstood. First, a popular modification of Hart’s theory is considered and rejected. It (...)
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  29. Empirismo y derechos humanos. Unas reflexiones a partir de la Filosofía del Derecho de K. Olivecrona.Oscar Vergara - 2017 - Persona y Derecho 75 (2017/1):7 - 29.
    Resumen: Tomado en serio, el empirismo parece abocar a la negación de los derechos humanos; al menos entendidos como expresión de la naturaleza humana. Bajo esta óptica, K. Olivecrona rechaza explícitamente todo Derecho natural, por considerarlo una noción metafísica. En cambio, cuando describe el Derecho positivo, se encuentra con que éste parece asegurar un determinado orden de valores. Olivecrona, además de describir este dato, en diversos escritos asume dichos valores e incluso los defiende. Esta última postura no es muy coherente (...)
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  30. Law as Plan and Artefact.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):325-340.
    Scott Shapiro’s theory that law is a social plan is helpful in seeing law essentially as a tool of human creation and as such is sympathetic to understanding law in terms of the social functions it performs, a method I argue for elsewhere. I focus here on two problems with the theory as presented. The planning theory does not adequately explain the persistence of law beyond the utility of those who implement it. Generally, plans can cease to exist as soon (...)
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  31. Ontology and Reason Giving in Law.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2016 - In Paweł Banaś, Adam Dyrda & Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki (eds.), Metaphilosophy of Law. Portland, Oregon: Hart. pp. 147-158.
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  32. Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good, by Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco.Ori J. Herstein - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1213-1222.
    Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good, by Rodriguez-BlancoVeronica. Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2014. Pp. 215.
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  33. Law’s Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 247-266.
    I argue that law is best understood as an institutionalized abstract artifact. Using the ideas of John Searle on institutions and Amie Thomasson on artifacts, I show how the law is capable of generating new reasons for action, arguing against recent work by David Enoch who holds that legal reason-giving is ultimately a form of triggering conditional reasons.
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  34. The Social Impact Theory of Law.Keton Joshua - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 9:130-137.
    Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1). Herein I argue that Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem of legal normativity is well motivated. Further, I argue that Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and more specifically obligations of joint (...)
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  35. Constructed and Wild Conceptual Necessities in Contemporary Jurisprudence.Stefan Sciaraffa - 2015 - Jurisprudence 6 (2):391-406.
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  36. Ciencia jurídica y sistemas normativos. Dos comentarios a la teoría de la ciencia jurídica de C.E. Alchourrón y E. Bulygin.Oscar Vergara - 2015 - Anuario Filosofía Del Derecho:253 - 278.
    Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la noción de ciencia jurídica de los profesores Carlos E. Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin. Ésta parte del presupuesto de que la ciencia jurídica no está autorizada a crear nuevo Derecho, sino que sólo puede aspirar legítimamente a representarlo de alguna manera. Eso no significa que la suya sea una actividad meramente especulativa, en el sentido etimológico del término. Esto es, la ciencia jurídica no se limita a reflejar, como en un espejo, el Derecho tal (...)
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  37. Entre el miedo y la fe. El positivismo jurídico ante la noción de fuerza obligatoria del Derecho.Oscar Vergara - 2015 - In José Antonio Santos & Cristina Hermida (eds.), Una filosofía del Derecho en acción. Madrid: Congreso de los Diputados. pp. 179 - 194.
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  38. Book Review: Legal Thought and Philosophy: What Legal Scholarship Is About, by Bert van Roermund. [REVIEW]Thomas Fossen - 2014 - Political Theory 42 (3):363-366.
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  39. The Hart‐Fuller Debate.Juan Vega Gomez - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (1):45-53.
    I will center the discussion of the Hart-Fuller debate on the five claims Hart mentions might be understood as legal positivisms main tenets: (1) the command theory; (2) the no necessary connection thesis; (3) the methodological claim; (4) the charge of positivism as formalism and the problem of interpretation; and (5) the meta-ethical confusion. In light of these five claims, I will explore whether the exchange of views between Hart and Fuller in 1957 truly amounted to a debate. Sorting out (...)
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  40. Law's Authority is not a Claim to Preemption.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2013 - In Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical foundations of the nature of law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 51.
    Joseph Raz argues that legal authority includes a claim by the law to replace subjects’ contrary reasons. I reply that this cannot be squared with the existence of choice-of-evils defenses to criminal prosecutions, nor with the view that the law has gaps (which Raz shares). If the function of authority is to get individuals to comply better with reason than they would do if left to their own devices, it would not make sense for law to claim both to pre-empt (...)
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  41. In Defense of Hart.Matthew H. Kramer - 2013 - In Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 22.
    In Legality Scott Shapiro seeks to provide the motivation for the development of his own elaborate account of law by undertaking a critique of H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudential theory. Hart maintained that every legal system is underlain by a rule of recognition through which officials of the system identify the norms that belong to the system as laws. Shapiro argues that Hart's remarks on the rule of recognition are confused and that his model of lawis consequently untenable. Shapiro contends that a (...)
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  42. Prawne a pozaprawne pojęcia dobra wspólnego [Legal and Extralegal Notions of Common Good].Marek Piechowiak - 2013 - In Wojciech Arndt, Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier & Krzysztof Szczucki (eds.), Dobro wspólne. Teoria i praktyka. Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. pp. 23-45.
    Opracowanie dotyczy relacji konstytucyjnego pojęcia „dobro wspólne” z art. 1 Konstytucji RP, do pozaprawnych pojęć dobra wspólnego. Bezpośredni asumpt do jego przygotowania dało zdanie odrębne sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Zbigniewa Cieślaka do wyroku TK z dnia 20 kwietnia 2011 r. w sprawie Kp 7/09, dotyczącej zmian w prawie budowlanym. Jest to w ogóle najobszerniejsza wypowiedź w całym dotychczasowym orzecznictwie TK poświęcona wprost problematyce dobra wspólnego. Sędzia Z. Cieślak wyraźnie odróżnił prawne pojęcie dobra wspólnego – jego zdaniem właściwe dla interpretacji klauzuli dobra (...)
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  43. Antipositivist Arguments from Legal Thought and Talk: The Metalinguistic Response.David Plunkett & Tim Sundell - 2013 - In Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind (eds.), Pragmatism, Law, and Language. New York: Routledge. pp. 56-75.
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  44. Olivecrona: Realismo e idealismo: Algunas reflexiones sobre la cuestión capital de la Filosofía del Derecho.Oscar Vergara - 2013 - Revista En Cultura de la Legalidad 5:248 - 263.
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  45. Lon Fuller's Legal Structuralism.William Conklin - 2012 - In Bjarne Melkevik (ed.), Standing Tall Hommages a Csaba Varga. Budapest: Pazmany Press. pp. 97-121.
    Anglo-American general jurisprudence remains preoccupied with the relationship of legality to morality. This has especially been so in the re-reading of Lon Fuller’s theory of an implied morality in any law. More often than not, Fuller has been said to distinguish between the identity of a discrete rule and something called ‘morality’. In this reading of Fuller, however, insufficient attention to what is signified by ‘morality’. Such an implied morality has been understood in terms of deontological duties, the Good life, (...)
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  46. The Anarchist Official: A Problem for Legal Positivism.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2011 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36:89-112.
    I examine the impact of the presence of anarchists among key legal officials upon the legal positivist theories of H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. For purposes of this paper, an anarchist is one who believes that the law cannot successfully obligate or create reasons for action beyond prudential reasons, such as avoiding sanction. I show that both versions of positivism require key legal officials to endorse the law in some way, and that if a legal system can continue to exist (...)
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  47. De idee van rechtvaardigheid van gedaante verwisseld: een Kelseniaanse oftewel relativistische benadering van de idee van rechtvaardigheid.Mathijs Notermans - 2011 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 103 (2):87-105.
    This article paradoxically tries to come closer to an idea of justice with the help of the destructive — anything but nihilistic — criticism thereof by Hans Kelsen. It argues that his relativistic approach, in which this idea undergoes a metamorphosis to become a realisable value of a social order, brings us closer to an obvious and objective form of justice that is almost taken for granted. Just in our liberal and plural democracy this approach might prove to be of (...)
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  48. Assessing Law's Claim to Authority.Bas van der Vossen - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):481-501.
    The idea that law claims authority (LCA) has recently been forcefully criticized by a number of authors. These authors present a new and intriguing objection, arguing that law cannot be said to claim authority if such a claim is not justified. That is, these authors argue that the view that law does not have authority viciously conflicts with the view that law claims authority. I will call this the normative critique of LCA. In this article, I assess the normative critique (...)
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  49. Morality, Politics, and Law.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2010 - Kendall Hunt Publishing.
    It is argued (a) that laws are assurances of protections of rights and (b) that governments are protectors of rights. Lest those assurances be empty and thus not really be assurances at all, laws must be enforced and governments must therefore have the power to coerce. For this reason, the government of a given region tends to have, as Max Weber put it, a "monopoly on power" in that region. And because governments are power-monopolizers, it is tempting to think that (...)
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  50. Let’s Skill All the Lawyers: Shakespearean Lessons on the Nature of Law.Harold Lloyd - 2010 - Vera Lex 11 (1/2):38-80.
    Shakespeare's works present intriguing explorations of law and legal theory. They help demonstrate the flaws in command-theory positivism, natural law theory and prediction theory accounts of the law. This is a simultaneously-published abbreviated version of a longer article published in Acta Iuridica Olomucensia in 2010.
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