Verdinglichung und Freiheit

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (5):717-730 (2011)
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In this paper I examine Lukács’ claim that the overcoming of reification amounts to the realization of the identity philosophies of Fichte and Hegel. I suggest that Lukács does indeed contrast reification with a Hegelian conception of social freedom that remains plausible today. Reification occurs when the preconditions of freedom and social participation are eroded through practices such as commodification and juridification. I conclude with the claim that reification diminishes freedom, and that criticism of reification is itself a form of freedom.

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Timo Jütten
University of Essex


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