Frankfurt Cases and Alternate Deontic Categories

Dialogue 62 (3):539-552 (2023)
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In Harry Frankfurt’s seminal “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” he advances an argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: if an agent is responsible for performing some action, then she is able to do otherwise. However, almost all of the Frankfurt cases in this literature involve impermissible actions. In this article, I argue that the failure to consider other deontic categories exposes a deep problem, one that threatens either to upend much current moral theorizing or to upend the relevance of Frankfurt cases.

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Samuel J. M. Kahn
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis


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