Prenatal Injury

Res Philosophica 101 (3):549-568 (2024)
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Abstract

In this article, I confront Jessica Flanigan’s recent attempt to show not merely that women have a right to commit prenatal injury, but also that women who act on this right are praiseworthy and should not be criticized for this injury. I show that Flanigan’s arguments do not work, and I establish presumptive grounds against any such right—namely, prenatal injury, by definition, involves intentional or negligent harm and, as such, may be subsumed under a wider class of actions that are presumptively wrong.

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Samuel J. M. Kahn
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

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