The Confirmation of Singular Causal Statements by Carnap’s Inductive Logic

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The aim of this paper is to apply inductive logic to the field that, presumably, Carnap never expected: legal causation. Legal causation is expressible in the form of singular causal statements; but it is distinguished from the customary concept of scientific causation, because it is subjective. We try to express this subjectivity within the system of inductive logic. Further, by semantic complement, we compensate a defect found in our application, to be concrete, the impossibility of two-place predicates (for causal relationship) in inductive logic.
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First archival date: 2013-11-11
Latest version: 2 (2013-11-16)
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