Rationality as the Rule of Reason

Noûs (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KAURAT-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-04-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-04-03

Total views
157 ( #16,339 of 38,056 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #9,153 of 38,056 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.