Grounded knowledge, place and epistemic virtue

Ethics, Place and Environment 8 (3):361 – 371 (2005)
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A response to Christopher Preston's book "Grounding Knowledge" (2003). I first argue that Preston’s work strongly suggests that epistemologists would do well to re-examine and pay greater attention to ‘knowledge how’. Second, I briefly consider several of Preston’s proposals (concerning the importance of place to our cognitive lives) through the lens of contemporary virtue epistemology and suggest how Preston’s work might inform and shape theorizing in this area. Finally, I turn to a set of potential questions for Preston, focusing in particular on his proposal that we ought to preserve a wide range of places inorder to allow for an epistemically valuable cognitive diversity.

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Jason Kawall
Colgate University


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