Is (merely) stalking sentient animals morally wrong?

Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):195–204 (2000)
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Such activities as tracking, watching, and photographing animals are frequently presented as morally superior alternatives to hunting, but could they themselves be morally problematic? In this paper I argue that, despite certain differences from the stalking of humans, a strong case can be made for the prima facie wrongness of stalking sentient animals. The chief harm of stalking is the fear and altered patterns of behavior which it forces upon its victims.

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Jason Kawall
Colgate University


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