The experience machine and mental state theories of well-being

Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387 (1999)
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Abstract
It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states is compatible with maintaining that the impact of such values upon our well-being lies in their impact upon our mental lives.
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