Kind Instantiation and Kind Change - A Problem for Four-Category Ontology

Studia Neoaristotelica 14 (2):139-165 (2017)
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Abstract
In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of Four-Category Ontology is obliged to resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level.
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2017
ISBN(s)
1214-8407
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KEIKIA
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First archival date: 2017-08-03
Latest version: 2 (2017-08-04)
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2017-08-03

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