Peer disagreement and higher order evidence

In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217 (2010)
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Abstract
My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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The Uniqueness Thesis.Kopec, Matthew & Titelbaum, Michael G.
Epistemic Modesty Defended.Christensen, David

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