Rights and consent in mixed martial arts

Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 47 (1):105-120 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

MMA fighting in a competition is not necessarily wrong and is often, as far as we can tell, permissible. Our argument has two premises. First, if an act does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint, then it is morally permissible. Second, MMA-violence does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint. The first premise rested on two assumptions. First, if a person does a wrong act, then he wrongs someone. Second, if one person wrongs a second, then the first infringes on the second’s right. We then looked at Nicholas Dixon’s powerful Kantian argument that MMA fighting is wrong.

Author Profiles

Robert M. Kelly
Bakersfield College
Stephen Kershnar
Fredonia State University

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-17

Downloads
596 (#25,724)

6 months
236 (#9,608)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?