9 found
Order:
  1. Rights and consent in mixed martial arts.Stephen Kershnar & Robert M. Kelly - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 47 (1):105-120.
    MMA fighting in a competition is not necessarily wrong and is often, as far as we can tell, permissible. Our argument has two premises. First, if an act does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint, then it is morally permissible. Second, MMA-violence does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint. The first premise rested on two assumptions. First, if a person does a wrong act, then he wrongs someone. Second, if one person wrongs (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. The inheritance-based claim to reparations.Stephen Kershnar - 2002 - Legal Theory 8 (2):243-267.
    Slavery harmed the slaves but not their descendants since slavery brought about their existence. The descendants gain the slaves’ claims via inheritance. However, collecting the inheritance-based claim runs into a number of difficulties. First, every descendant usually has no more than a portion of the slave’s claim because the claim is often divided over generations. Second, there are epistemic difficulties involving the ownership of the claim since it is unlikely that a descendant of a slave several generations removed would have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3.  46
    Explaining the Geometry of Desert.Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar - 2004 - Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.
    In the past decade, three philosophers in particular have recently explored the relation between desert and intrinsic value. Fred Feldman argues that consequentialism need not give much weight – or indeed any weight at all – to the happiness of persons who undeservedly experience pleasure. He defends the claim that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is determined by the “fit” between the amount of well-being that a person receives and the amount of well-being that the person deserves. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  4. The Most Valuable Player.Stephen Kershnar & Neil Feit - 2001 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28 (2):193-206.
    The most valuable player (MVP) of an athletic league is the single best individual player in the league. The MVP award is the institutional recognition of this person, and it is the highest annual award that a player can receive. Despite its widespread consideration and importance, we argue that the concept of the MVP is a fundamentally vague concept. In the context of professional sports, however, such a vague category is valuable in that it promotes the active discussion of different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. The Forfeiture Theory of Punishment: Surviving Boonin’s Objections.Stephen Kershnar - 2010 - Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (4):319-334.
    In this paper, I set out a version of the Forfeiture Theory of Punishment. Forfeiture Theory: Legal punishment is just or permissible because offenders forfeit their rights.On this account, offenders forfeit their rights because they infringed on someone’s rights. My strategy is to provide a version of the Forfeiture Theory and then to argue that it survives a number of initially intuitive seeming objections, most having their origins in the recent work of David Boonin.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. The Right-Based Criticism of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Stephen Kershnar & Robert M. Kelly - 2020 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):215-233.
    If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Responsibility-Foundation: Still Needed and Still Missing.Stephen Kershnar & Robert M. Kelly - forthcoming - Science, Religion and Culture.
    Responsibility is impossible because there is no responsibility-maker and there needs to be one if people are morally responsible. The two most plausible candidates, psychology and decision, fail. A person is not responsible for an unchosen psychology or a psychology that was chosen when the person is not responsible for the choice. This can be seen in intuitions about instantly-created and manipulated people. This result is further supported by the notion that, in general, the right, the good, and virtue rest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. For Torture: A Rights-Based Defense.Stephen Kershnar - 2011 - Lexington Books.
    This book is an analysis and evaluation of torture. My take on torture is unique for four reasons. First, it provides a distinct analysis of what torture is. Second, it argues that on non-consequentialist grounds, specifically rights-based ones, torture is sometimes permissible. Third, it argues that torturers are not always vicious. Fourth, it argues that it is plausible that these conclusions apply to some real world cases. In short, it fills the following gap: it evaluates torture from a rights-based perspective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Hellman, Deborah. When Is Discrimination Wrong?Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Pp. 216. $39.95 ; $17.95. [REVIEW]Stephen Kershnar - 2013 - Ethics 123 (2):374-377.
    In summary, Hellman’s book is well worth reading. It is powerful, well-written, and interesting and explains much of the prominent case law on discrimination. Her theory, however, is false because her explanation of wrongful discrimination fails to track a wrong-making feature. Her theory does not focus on a right-infringement in or unfair treatment of the person whom is discriminated against. It also does not focus on an incorrect attitude in the person who discriminates. These intuitively seem to exhaust the reasons (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark