The Right-Based Criticism of the Doctrine of Double Effect

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or a promotion of the common good). The weak version asserts that, other things being equal, it is deontically worse to intentionally infringe a norm than to foreseeably do so. A person’s intention or mere foresight might still be relevant to his or her blameworthiness or virtue, but this is a separate issue.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KERTRC
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-08-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-04-01

Total views
77 ( #51,862 of 65,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #15,306 of 65,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.