Inference, Explanation, and Asymmetry

Synthese (Suppl 4):929-953 (2018)
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Abstract
Explanation is asymmetric: if A explains B, then B does not explain A. Tradition- ally, the asymmetry of explanation was thought to favor causal accounts of explanation over their rivals, such as those that take explanations to be inferences. In this paper, we develop a new inferential approach to explanation that outperforms causal approaches in accounting for the asymmetry of explanation.
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First archival date: 2018-04-25
Latest version: 3 (2018-04-27)
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