Results for 'Personal identity'

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  1. Personal identity and persisting as many.Sara Weaver & John Turri - 2018 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume 2. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 213-242.
    Many philosophers hypothesize that our concept of personal identity is partly constituted by the one-person-one-place rule, which states that a person can only be in one place at a time. This hypothesis has been assumed by the most influential contemporary work on personal identity. In this paper, we report a series of studies testing whether the hypothesis is true. In these studies, people consistently judged that the same person existed in two different places at the same (...)
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  2. Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Choice in Medical Ethics.Lucie White - 2020 - In Michael Kühler & Veselin L. Mitrović (eds.), Theories of the Self and Autonomy in Medical Ethics. Springer. pp. 31-47.
    When talking about personal identity in the context of medical ethics, ethicists tend to borrow haphazardly from different philosophical notions of personal identity, or to abjure these abstract metaphysical concerns as having nothing to do with practical questions in medical ethics. In fact, however, part of the moral authority for respecting a patient’s self-regarding decisions can only be made sense of if we make certain assumptions that are central to a particular, psychological picture of personal (...)
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  3. Personal identity in multicultural constitutional democracies.H. P. P. Lotter - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):179-198.
    Awareness of, and respect for differences of gender, race, religion, language, and culture have liberated many oppressed groups from the hegemony of white, Western males. However, respect for previously denigrated collective identities should not be allowed to confine individuals to identities constructed around one main component used for political mobilisation, or to identities that depend on a priority of properties that are not optional, like race, gender, and language. In this article I want to sketch an approach for accommodating different (...)
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  4. Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for (...)
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  5. Personal-identity Non-cognitivism.Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    In this paper I outline and defend a new approach to personal-identitypersonal-identity non-cognitivism—and argue that it has several advantages over its cognitivist rivals. On this view utterances of personal-identity sentences express a non-cognitive attitude towards relevant person-stages. The resulting view offers a pleasingly nuanced picture of what we are doing when we utter such sentences.
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  6. Personal identity and the Phineas Gage effect.Kevin P. Tobia - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):396-405.
    Phineas Gage’s story is typically offered as a paradigm example supporting the view that part of what matters for personal identity is a certain magnitude of similarity between earlier and later individuals. Yet, reconsidering a slight variant of Phineas Gage’s story indicates that it is not just magnitude of similarity, but also the direction of change that affects personal identity judgments; in some cases, changes for the worse are more seen as identity-severing than changes for (...)
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  7. Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):37-43.
    The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous (...)
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  8. Personal Identity and Persistence: An Evolving Bundle of Mental and Physical Features.Aaron Rivera - manuscript
    The problem of personal identity contains various questions and issues, but the main issue is persistence; how can one person remain the same over time? Modern philosophers have proposed various solutions to this problem; however, none are without problems. David Hume rejected the notion of personal identity as fictitious and posited a theory that personal identity is merely a bundle of perceptions which does not remain the same over time. Hume’s approach to personal (...)
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  9.  16
    On Personal Identity Over Time.Mary Antoinette Weigel - manuscript
    This paper discusses Shoemaker's (1984) account of personal identity over time and the problems person essentialism raises for psychological continuity theories of personal identity at large, as detailed by Olson and Witt (2020).
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  10.  33
    Emergent Illusionism: Rethinking Personal Identity in the Cryonics Conundrum.Shubham Dominic - manuscript
    Science fiction no longer has the same potential due to the fast advancements in science and technology. Scientists have known for a long time that certain species may live for extensive periods of time in a condition that resembles death. The stunning change of the North American Wood Frog throughout the winter months is one fascinating example. Its heart stops beating and its body freezes solid, completely shutting down its whole physiological system at this period. But when summer-time warmth arrives, (...)
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  11. Introduction: Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?Georg Gasser & Matthias Stefan - 2012 - In Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-17.
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  12. Distributed selves: Personal identity and extended memory systems.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3135–3151.
    This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s diachronic self. (...)
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  13. Personal Identity and Patient-Centered Medical Decision Making.Lucie White - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (3):194-195.
    Nancy Jecker and Andrew Ko (2017) wish to present an account of personal identity which captures what matters to the patient and places the patient at the center of medical decisions. They focus particularly on medical interventions in the brain that can cause drastic changes in personality; under what circumstances should we say the patient has 'survived' these changes? More specifically, how can we best understand the notion of survival in a way that captures what is of concern (...)
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  14.  88
    Personal Identity: What’s the Problem?Nathan Salmon - 2005 - In _Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning: Philosophical Papers I_. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 192-225.
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  15. Personal Identity.Jacqueline Mariña - 2008 - In Transformation of the Self in the thought of Schleiermacher. Oxford University Press.
    This is the third chapter of my book Transformation of the self, which covers Schleiermacher's reception of Kant on the problem of personal identity.
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  16. Consciousness and Personal Identity.Owen Ware & Donald C. Ainslie - 2014 - In Aaron Garrett (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 245-264.
    This paper offers an overview of consciousness and personal identity in eighteenth-century philosophy. Locke introduces the concept of persons as subjects of consciousness who also simultaneously recognize themselves as such subjects. Hume, however, argues that minds are nothing but bundles of perceptions, lacking intrinsic unity at a time or across time. Yet Hume thinks our emotional responses to one another mean that persons in everyday life are defined by their virtues, vices, bodily qualities, property, riches, and the like. (...)
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  17. Conativism about personal identity.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - 2020 - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. Routledge. pp. 159-269.
    This paper aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that role are public or private. We then offer a (...)
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  18. Cognition, Persons, Identity.Simon Beck - 2003 - Alternation 10 (1):195-215.
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  19. Locke on Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Her interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. By taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity, Boeker shows that we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On (...)
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  20. Personal Identity and Its Properties.Eldar Sarajlic - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 10 (2):193-233.
    In this paper, I offer a conceptual framework for understanding and evaluating personal identity claims. I analyze ontological and political properties of personal identity separately, arguing that their conceptual (if not practical) separation is necessary for a proper evaluation of different identity claims. I use probability theory to bypass some of the logical difficulties in conceptualizing personal identity and discuss a case of transitional identification. Finally, I outline the guidelines for a justified liberal (...)
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  21. Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit.Jonny Anomaly - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.
    ABSTRACT: This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating (...)
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  22. Personal Identity and Brain Identity.Nils-Frederic Wagner & Georg Northoff - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge. pp. 335-351.
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  23. Personal Identity Without Persons.Jens David Ohlin - 2002 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    The project takes as its starting point our conflicting intuitions about personal identity exposed by Bernard Williams' thought experiment involving the switching of bodies in "The Self and the Future." The conflicted intuitions are identified as animalist and psychologist and correspond roughly with the two major approaches to personal identity. The traditional strategy to resolve the conflict---thought experiments---is critically examined and the project concludes that proper thought experiments will reveal the conflict but are unlikely to resolve (...)
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  24. Personal Identity and Dual Character Concepts.Joshua Knobe - 2022 - In Kevin Tobia (ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self. London: Bloomsbury.
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  25. Narrative and Personal Identity.Mark Schroeder - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):209-226.
    In this paper I explore how and why personal identity might be essentially narrative in nature. My topic is the question of personal identity in the strict sense of identity—the question of which person you are, and how that person is extended in space, time, and quality. In this my question appears to contrast with the question of personal identity in the sense sought by teenagers and sufferers of mid-life crises who are trying (...)
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  26. Locke on Personal Identity.Shelley Weinberg - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.
    Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features (...)
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  27. Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.
    Compatibilists disagree over whether there are historical conditions on moral responsibility. Historicists claim there are, whilst structuralists deny this. Historicists motivate their position by claiming to avoid the counter-intuitive implications of structuralism. I do two things in this paper. First, I argue that historicism has just as counter-intuitive implications as structuralism when faced with thought experiments inspired by those found in the personal identity literature. Hence, historicism is not automatically preferable to structuralism. Second, I argue that structuralism is (...)
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  28. Brutal Personal Identity.Peihong Xie - 2023 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 9 (2):75-94.
    This paper presents a new anti-criterialist view, Brutal Personal Identity (BPI). According to BPI, personal identity is a quasi-fundamental fact, which is metaphysically grounded in brute facts about absolutely fundamental personhood. By reversing the order of metaphysical explanation, BPI is not a form of identity mysticism as Dean Zimmerman asserts. Instead, BPI has even the potential to lay a solid foundation for developing an appropriate account of mentality and first-person perspectives. Furthermore, a comparison between BPI (...)
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  29. DBS, Personal Identity, and Diachronic Value.Doug McConnell - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (2):47-49.
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  30. Personal Identity and Moral Psychology.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
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  31. Subjective Theories of Personal Identity and Practical Concerns.Radim Bělohrad - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3):282-301.
    This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers (...)
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  32. Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity.Christian Mott - 2018 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two. New York, NY, USA: pp. 243-269.
    Legal theorists have proposed several theories to justify statutes of limitations in the criminal law, but none of these normative theories is generally accepted. This chapter investigates the related descriptive question as to whether ordinary people have the intuition that legal punishment becomes less appropriate as time passes from the date of the offense and, if they do, what factors play a role in these intuitions. Five studies demonstrate that there is an intuitive statute of limitations on both legal punishment (...)
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  33. Personal Identity and Subjective Time: Readings in From Brain to Cosmos.Mark F. Sharlow - manuscript
    This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 5) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. That excerpt presents an analysis of personal identity through time, using the concept of subjective fact that the author developed earlier in the book. (Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to Cosmos first. See the last page of this document for details on how to obtain those chapters.).
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  34. The informational nature of personal identity.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):549-566.
    In this paper, I present an informational approach to the nature of personal identity. In “Plato and the problem of the chariot”, I use Plato’s famous metaphor of the chariot to introduce a specific problem regarding the nature of the self as an informational multiagent system: what keeps the self together as a whole and coherent unity? In “Egology and its two branches” and “Egology as synchronic individualisation”, I outline two branches of the theory of the self: one (...)
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  35. Transhumanism and Personal Identity.James Hughes - 2013 - In Max More & Natasha Vita‐More (eds.), The Transhumanist Reader. Oxford: Wiley. pp. 227=234.
    Enlightenment values are built around the presumption of an independent rational self, citizen, consumer and pursuer of self-interest. Even the authoritarian and communitarian variants of the Enlightenment presumed the existence of autonomous individuals, simply arguing for greater weight to be given to their collective interests. Since Hume, however, radical Enlightenment empiricists have called into question the existence of a discrete, persistent self. Today neuroscientific reductionism has contributed to the rejection of an essentialist model of personal identity. Contemporary transhumanism (...)
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  36. Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self.Robert Schroer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):339-356.
    The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)
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  37. Personal Identity and Self-Interpretation & Natural Right and Natural Emotions.Gabor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2020 - Budapest: Eötvös University Press.
    Collection of papers presented at the 2nd and 3rd Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.
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  38. Thought experiments and personal identity in africa.Simon Beck - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):239-452.
    African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with their emphasis on the importance of community and social relations more widely discussed, but that emphasis has also received much wider acceptance and gained more influence among Western philosophers. Despite this convergence, there is at least one striking way in which the discussions remain (...)
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  39. On Scepticism About Personal Identity Thought Experiments.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Caroline West & Wen Yu - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 1.
    Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity, and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal identity. Using the methods (...)
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  40. Facial Allograft Transplantation, Personal Identity, and Subjectivity.J. S. Swindell Blumenthal-Barby - 2007 - Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (8):449-453.
    An analysis of the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation is provided in this paper. The identity issues involved in organ transplantation in general, under both theoretical accounts of personal identity and subjective accounts provided by organ recipients, are examined. It is argued that the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation are similar to those involved in organ transplantation in general, but much stronger because the face is so closely linked with personal (...)
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  41. Memory and Personal Identity in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):243-268.
    Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of theEssay,he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or a soul can.
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  42. Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences.Ruth Boeker - 2015 - Hume Studies 41 (2):105-135.
    Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to (...)
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  43. Identifying the problem of personal identity.Ned Markosian - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press. pp. 129.
    This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles (...)
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  44. Personal Identity, Possible Worlds, and Medical Ethics.Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal (3):429-437.
    Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal skepticism according to which (...)
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  45. Introduction to Part Three: Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 48-67.
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  46. Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity, and Character Development.Ruth Boeker - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (1):e12471.
    Shaftesbury’s major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most influential English works in the eighteenth century. This paper focuses on his contributions to debates about persons and personal identity and shows that Shaftesbury regards metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely connected with normative questions of character development. I argue that he is willing to accept that persons are substances and that he takes their continued existence for granted. He sees the (...)
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  47. Morality Grounds Personal Identity.Bradley Monton - 2014 - Philosophical Analysis 31:1-26.
    There is a connection between moral facts and personal identity facts: morality grounds personal identity. If, for example, old Sally enters a teletransporter, and new Sally emerges, the fundamental question to ask is: is new Sally morally responsible for actions (and omissions) of old Sally? If the moral facts are such that she is morally responsible, then Sally persisted through the teletransporter event, and if not, Sally ceased to exist.
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  48. The construction of personal identities online.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):477-479.
    Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are building a new habitat (infosphere) in which future generations, living in advanced information societies, will spend an increasing amount of time. This paper introduces a series of articles that explore what constitutes a personal identity online (PIO) and how, as well as to what extent, individuals can learn to create, manage and perceive their PIOs in order to facilitate a healthy and rewarding online experience (onlife).
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  49. The sense of diachronic personal identity.Stan Klein - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):791-811.
    In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one’s sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one’s personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self-knowledge. The second issue I (...)
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  50. Personal Identity, Moral Agency and Liangzhi: A Comparative Study of Korsgaard and Wang Yangming.Chang Tzuli - 2015 - Comparative Philosophy 6 (1):03-23.
    Christine Korsgaard bases her interpretation of personal identity upon the notion of moral agency and thereby refutes the Reductionist thesis of Derek Parfit. Korsgaard indicates that actions and choices, from the practical standpoint, must be viewed as having agents and choosers. This is what makes them our own actions and choices as well as contributes to the process of self-constitution. Personal identity manifested as the chooser of our desires and author of our actions can be viewed (...)
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