Conceivability and Haecceitism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This essay aims to redress the contention that epistemic possibility cannot be a guide to the principles of modal metaphysics. I argue that the interaction between the two-dimensional intensional framework and the mereological parthood relation enables epistemic possibilities to target the haecceitistic properties of individuals. I outline the elements of plural logic, and I specify, then, a two-dimensional intensional formula encoding the relation between the epistemic possibility of haecceity comprehension and its metaphysical possibility. I examine the Julius Caesar problem as a test case. I conclude by addressing objections from the indeterminacy of ontological principles relative to the space of epistemic possibilities, and from the consistency of epistemic modal space.
No keywords specified (fix it)
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-08-15
Latest version: 5 (2020-12-08)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
25 ( #54,046 of 55,922 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #30,082 of 55,922 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.