Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life

In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 244-255 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Since subjection to harm is an intrinsic feature of our social and epistemic lives, there is a perpetual need for individual and collective agents with the virtue of epistemic courage. In this chapter, I survey some of the main issues germane to this virtue, such as the nature of courage and of harm, the range of epistemic activities that can manifest courage, and the status of epistemic courage as a collective and as a professional virtue.
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First archival date: 2017-12-22
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