Kant and McDowell on the Purposiveness of Nature

In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 771-780 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper I will be making a connection between Kant’s Critique of Judgment and John McDowell’s Mind and World. This connection is an apt one because McDowell’s work is concerned with the same issue that is at the center of the third Critique, namely the question of a “fit” between our concepts and the world of our experience. In the first section of the paper, I situate McDowell’s view in relation to Kant. Their key point of difference, I think, is that McDowell wants to reject Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena. In the second section, I argue that in the Critique of Judgment Kant takes up the same problem with which McDowell is concerned in Mind and World, but without adopting his solution to this problem. In the third and final section, I speculate on Kant’s reasons for insisting on holding on to the distinction between phenomena and noumena.

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Ted Kinnaman
George Mason University

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