Knowledge, Pragmatics, and Error

Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):429-57 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
‘Know-that’, like so many natural language expressions, exhibits patterns of use that provide evidence for its context-sensitivity. A popular family of views – call it prag- matic invariantism – attempts to explain the shifty patterns by appeal to a pragmatic thesis: while the semantic meaning of ‘know-that’ is stable across all contexts of use, sentences of the form ‘S knows [doesn’t know] that p’ can be used to communicate a pragmatic content that depends on the context of use. In this paper, the author argues that pragmatic invariantism makes inaccurate predictions for a wide range of well- known use data and is committed to attributing systematic pragmatic error to ordinary speakers. But pragmatic error is unprecedented, and it is doubtful that speakers are systematically wrong about what they intend to communicate.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KINKPA
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-10-24
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-10-24

Total views
268 ( #18,203 of 53,601 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #14,789 of 53,601 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.