On Libertarianism as an Explanatory Hypothesis

Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (2):91-110 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Recently, several libertarian philosophers have argued that we appear free on the basis of widespread experience, and that this appearance justifies believing that we enjoy libertarian free will (e.g. Pink 2004 and Swinburne 2013). Such arguments have a long history in philosophy but have been easily dismissed on one of two grounds: either the appearance of freedom does not exist, or else it is an illusion. In this paper, I argue that although presentations of the argument have been historically inadequate, non-libertarians have also seriously underappreciated the force of libertarian appeals to phenomenology. I show that, when properly construed, the appearance of freedom constitutes a wide range of diverse phenomena in need of explanation, of which extant non-libertarian alternatives provide only partial explanations, or else fail to explain altogether. In identifying this lacuna, I take the first step towards providing a better non-libertarian alternative.
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-08-05
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
41 ( #58,407 of 64,211 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #44,048 of 64,211 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.