Abstract

Expert consensus is crucial for those who are not relevant experts in the field in which they are studying. However, for those who are a relevant expert in the field of a philosophic subject, there is a debate that asks if a minority view can ever be considered rational. Bryan Frances argues that if one is a relevant expert in a field, and is in the minority, their views must be irrational. In this essay I will be arguing that Frances' argument fails in terms of the 'explanation' way, leading to leery acceptance of the 'no-process' way. I argue that relevant expert consensus does not matter; it is evaluating the argument that one makes. First, I discuss the debate on whether a relevant expert can disregard consensus and what a relevant expert is. Secondly, I deconstruct Frances' view charitably. Third, I analyze the issues with Frances' argument. Lastly, I offer an alternative to evaluating a minority view amongst relevant experts.