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  1. Consideratism and the Credence of Conflicting Concepts (2022).David Klier -
    Skepticism has had a problem for a long time: it seems self-defeating. If I can’t trust something, can I trust that I can’t trust it? Pyrrho thought that “No one knows anything - and even that’s not certain.” [1] Or at least, that was Pyrrho’s answer to the “self-defeat objection.” Whether this is convincing or not, it has been known that throughout philosophical history, having a skeptical bone in your body is a good thing. From Socrates saying “the only thing (...)
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  2.  79
    Why Do I Love You? (2022).David Klier - manuscript
    There are two major conflicting views that surround the debate of the reasons for love. The first being the quality view, where we love for one’s qualities, qualities that are specific to the beloved, or possibly generally likable traits. The other is the relationship view, whereby love is the result of sharing a loving relationship. In this essay, I will be looking at two modern amendments to these views, Yongming Han’s (2021) ‘Humean conception’ of love, and Sara Protasi’s (2016) ‘Experiential (...)
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  3.  26
    Reason Trumps All: Rationality of Minority Views in Relevant Expert Consensus (2021).David Klier - manuscript
    Expert consensus is crucial for those who are not relevant experts in the field in which they are studying. However, for those who are a relevant expert in the field of a philosophic subject, there is a debate that asks if a minority view can ever be considered rational. Bryan Frances argues that if one is a relevant expert in a field, and is in the minority, their views must be irrational. In this essay I will be arguing that Frances' (...)
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