Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 'Theory of mind' and moral judgment

Psychological Science 17:421-427 (2006)
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Abstract
The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where ‘theory of mind’ and moral judgment meet. Preschool children’s judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side-effect is brought about 'on purpose' when the side-effect itself is morally bad but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of ‘on-purpose’ (as opposed to purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentional action are usually assumed to be purely factual. That these judgments are sometimes partly normative — even in preschoolers — challenges current understanding. Young children’s judgments regarding foreseen side-effects depend upon whether the children process the idea that the character does not care about the side-effect. As soon as preschoolers effectively process the ‘theory of mind’ concept, NOT CARE THAT P, children show the side-effect effect.idea..
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Archival date: 2019-03-07
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Experimental Philosophy.Knobe, Joshua; Buckwalter, Wesley; Nichols, Shaun; Robbins, Philip; Sarkissian, Hagop & Sommers, Tamler
Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action.Pinillos, N. Ángel; Smith, Nick; Nair, G. Shyam; Mun, Cecilea & Marchetto, Peter

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