Abstract

In this paper, I explain how Bentham’s utilitarianism is at odds with Effective Altruism’s (EA) abstract use of numbers to calculate the most ‘effective’ ways to do good. This is interesting because Bentham is widely regarded as the father of modern utilitarianism and EA is a movement popularly associated with utilitarianism today. My paper is divided into 3 parts. In part 1, I explain how Bentham’s utilitarianism is built on a view of pleasure as widely varied and inherently subjective. In part 2, I discuss a version of utilitarianism that bears a superficial resemblance to Bentham’s but diverges from his theory in crucial ways. I show that it is with this second version, rather than Bentham’s, that EA shares more in common. In part 3, I sketch out a Benthamite critique of EA.