Theoretical Controversies—Terminological Biases: Consciousness Revisited

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):143-160 (2015)
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Abstract

Although scientific practice sometimes encounters philosophical dif- ficulties, it cannot shoulder the burden of resolving them. This can lead to controversies. An unavoidable difficulty is rooted in the linguistic attitude, i.e., in the fact that to a considerable extent we express our thoughts in words. I will attempt to illuminate some important characteristics of linguistic expres- sion which lead to paradoxical situations, identifiable thanks to philosophy. In my argument, I will investigate how the notion of consciousness has altered over the course of philosophical investigation and how it relates to recent scientific practice. In conclusion, I will focus on a few recent so-called radical positions in philosophy with regard to a framework within which consciousness and more generally mental phenomena can be regarded in a new light, as well as on the barriers we face when trying to unify scientific results.

Author's Profile

Zsuzsanna Kondor
Research Centre for The Humanities. Institute of Philosophy

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