Evolutionary Debunking and Moral Relativism

In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. New York: Routledge. pp. 190-199 (2020)
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Abstract

Our aim here is to explore the prospects of a relativist response to moral debunking arguments. We begin by clarifying the relativist thesis under consideration, and we explain why relativists seem well-positioned to resist the arguments in a way that avoids the drawbacks of existing responses. We then show that appearances are deceiving. At bottom, the relativist response is no less question-begging than standard realist responses, and – when we turn our attention to the strongest formulation of the debunking argument – the virtues of relativism turn out to be vices.

Author Profiles

Daniel Z. Korman
University of California at Santa Barbara
Dustin Locke
Claremont McKenna College

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