Diachronic Self-Making

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362 (2020)
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This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View, the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de se beliefs. To solve this problem, the paper defends the possibility of overlapping people, and addresses a number of objections to this idea.
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Archival date: 2019-09-02
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