Results for 'animalism'

37 found
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  1.  99
    Animalism is Either False of Uninteresting (Perhaps Both).Matt Duncan - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):187-200.
    “We are animals.” That’s what animalists say—that’s their slogan. But what animalists mean by their slogan varies. Many animalists are adamant that what they mean—and, indeed, what the true animalist thesis is—is that we are identical to animals (human animals, to be precise). But others say that’s not enough. They say that the animalist thesis has to be something more—perhaps that we are essentially or most fundamentally human animals. This paper argues that, depending on how we understand it, animalism (...)
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  2. Animalism and Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.
    Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory neo-Lockean constitutionalism or Lockeanism for short. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to (...)
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  3. Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort.Roger Melin - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):69-86.
    In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism (...)
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  4. Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.
    This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.
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  5.  88
    Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition.Radim Bělohrad - 2019 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 26 (2):207–227.
    Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea (...)
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  6. The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism.David Shoemaker - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 303-328.
    Animalism—the view that the identity across time of individuals like us consists in the persistence of our animal organisms—does poorly at accounting for our identity-related practical concerns. The reason is straightforward: whereas our practical concerns seem to track the identity of psychological creatures—persons—animalism focuses on the identity of human organisms who are not essentially persons. This lack of fit between our practical concerns and animalism has been taken to reduce animalism’s plausibility (relative to psychological criteria of (...)
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  7. Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon . Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals and Identity, Reviewed By.Alex Moran - 2017 - Philosophy in Review 37 (3):94-96.
    This is a review of the excellent collection by Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon which collates essays pertaining to Animalism: the theory that we human persons are identical with the human animals we share our lives with, and thus have the property of being human animals; perhaps essentially and most fundamentally.
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  8.  54
    Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity.Kristin Seemuth Whaley - 2021 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
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  9. Animals, Advance Directives, and Prudence: Should We Let the Cheerfully Demented Die?David Limbaugh - 2016 - Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 2 (4):481-489.
    A high level of confidence in the identity of individuals is required to let them die as ordered by an advance directive. Thus, if we are animalists, then we should lack the confidence required to apply lethal advance directives to the cheerfully demented, or so I argue. In short, there is consensus among animalists that the best way to avoid serious objections to their account is to adopt an ontology that denies the existence of brains, hands, tables, chairs, iced-tea, and (...)
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  10. Animal Self-Awareness.Rory Madden - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (9).
    Part of the philosophical interest of the topic of organic individuals is that it promises to shed light on a basic and perennial question of philosophical self-understanding, the question what are we? The class of organic individuals seems to be a good place to look for candidates to be the things that we are. However there are, in principle, different ways of locating ourselves within the class of organic individuals; organic individuals occur at both higher and lower mereological levels than (...)
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  11. The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem.C. S. Sutton - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):619-639.
    Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is (...)
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  12. Immaterialist Solutions to Puzzles in Personal Ontology.Kristin Seemuth Whaley - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    What are we? Despite much discussion in historical and contemporary philosophy, we have not yet settled on an answer. A satisfactory personal ontology, an account of our metaphysical nature, will be informed by issues in the metaphysics of material objects. In the dissertation, I target two prominent materialist ontologies: animalism, the view that we are numerically identical to human organisms, and constitutionalism, the view that we are constituted by, but not identical to, human organisms. Because of the problems that (...)
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  13. Persons, Animals, Ourselves by Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW]C. S. Sutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv057.
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  14.  51
    Biometrics and the Metaphysics of Personal Identity.Amy Kind - forthcoming - IET Biometrics.
    The vast advances in biometrics over the past several decades have brought with them a host of pressing concerns. Philosophical scrutiny has already been devoted to many of the relevant ethical and political issues, especially ones arising from matters of privacy, bias, and security in data collection. But philosophers have devoted surprisingly little attention to the relevant metaphysical issues, in particular, ones concerning matters of personal identity. This paper aims to take some initial steps to correct this oversight. After discussing (...)
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  15.  88
    Too Many Animals, Too Many Thinkers.Kristin Seemuth Whaley - manuscript
    Animalism, the thesis that each of us is a human animal, is a prominent materialist account of what we are. Animalism is often motivated by an attractive line of reasoning, the Thinking Animal Argument. And, independently, animalism has been challenged by appeals to a metaphysical puzzle, the problem of the many. In this paper, I draw attention to the relationship between the Thinking Animal Argument and the problem of the many. I further argue that in virtue of (...)
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  16. The Substance View: A Critique.Rob Lovering - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (5):263-70.
    According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have (...)
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  17. Why a Bodily Resurrection?: The Bodily Resurrection and the Mind/Body Relation.Mugg Joshua & James T. Turner Jr - 2017 - Journal of Analytic Theology 5:121-144.
    The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that (...)
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  18. Animals, Identity and Persistence.Christopher Belshaw - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):401 - 419.
    A number of claims are closely connected with, though logically distinct from, animalism. One is that organisms cease to exist when they die. Two others concern the relation of the brain, or the brainstem, to animal life. One of these holds that the brainstem is necessary for life?more precisely, that (say) my cat's brainstem is necessary for my cat's life to continue. The other is that it is sufficient for life?more precisely, that so long as (say) my cat's brainstem (...)
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  19.  81
    Why a Right to Life Rules Out Infanticide: A Final Reply to Räsänen.Bruce P. Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (8):965-967.
    Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, (...)
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  20.  67
    Subjective Theories of Personal Identity and Practical Concerns.Radim Bělohrad - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3):282-301.
    This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers to the numerical identity of persons and its analysis (...)
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  21.  50
    ПерезАГрУзКА а. в. НеХаев омский государственный технический университет, г. омск личНости и выживаНие.а. в НеХаев - 2020 - Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 5 (3):101-108.
    статья содержит реконструкцию аргумента стремительных психологических изменений скотта кэмпбелла. согласно требованиям стандартного психоло- гического подхода, тождество личности основано на постоянстве ее воспо- минаний, убеждений, желаний и намерений. личность сохраняет свое тож- дество во времени, если обладает сильной психологической связанностью и преемственностью. структура аргумента стремительных психологических изменений сопоставляется с аргументом невероятно длительных психологи- ческих изменений дэвида льюиса. главными целями критических атак этих аргументов служат временная рассогласованность психологической связан- ности и преемственности, а также тезис редукционизма, что все важные для выживания факты могут (...)
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  22. Reflections on Persimals.Marya Schechtman - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):163-170.
    Steven Luper offers richly-textured arguments against the Embodied Part View developed by Jeff McMahan and offered as an answer to the “too many thinkers” problem. One of the major objections he raises is connected to McMahan's claim that the mind, and so the person, is to be identified with the part of the brain in which consciousness is directly realized. This view has the implausible consequence, Luper argues, that persons do not and cannot think or reason or have desires or (...)
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  23. Schrödinger’s Fetus Examined.Bruce P. Blackshaw - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy:1-3.
    Joona Räsänen has proposed a concept he calls Schrödinger’s Fetus as a solution to reconciling what he believes are two widely held but contradictory intuitions. I show that Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle, upon which Schrödinger’s Fetus is based, uses a more convincing account of personhood. I also argue that both Räsänen and Harman, by embracing animalism, weaken their arguments by allowing Don Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion into the frame.
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  24.  50
    The Interaction of Noetic and Psychosomatic Operations in a Thomist Hylomorphic Anthropology.Daniel De Haan - 2018 - Scientia et Fides 6 (2):55-83.
    This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person’s immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that (...)
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  25.  40
    Survivalism, Suitably Modified.James Dominic Rooney - forthcoming - The Thomist.
    A well-known problem seems to beset views on which humans are essentially material, but where I can survive my death: they seem incoherent or reducible to substance dualism. Thomas Aquinas held a unique hylomorphic view of the human person as essentially composed of body and soul, but where the human soul can survive the death of the body. ‘Survivalists’ have argued that, post mortem, a human person comes to be composed of their soul alone. ‘Corruptionists’ point to Thomas’ texts, where (...)
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  26. Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival.Denis Robinson - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-32.
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...)
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  27. Animals, Brains, and Spirits.Charles Taliaferro - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):567-581.
    This paper contains an overview of the significance of dualism for theism and a modal argument for dualism. It concludes with remarks on the relevance of the modal case on behalf of dualism for an intramural materialist quarrel between animalists and brain-identity theorists.
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  28. Conceivability, Possibility and the Resurrection of Material Beings.Thomas Atkinson - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2):115-132.
    In his 1998 postscript to ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ Peter van Inwagen argues that the scenario he describes by which God might resurrect a human organism, even though probably not true, is still conceivable and, consequently, ‘serves to establish a possibility’, namely, the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of material beings. Van Inwagen, however, has also argued in favour of ‘modal scepticism’ [van Inwagen in, God, knowledge and mystery: essays in philosophical theology, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995b, pp. 11–12; van (...)
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  29.  81
    Approaching Other Animals with Caution: Exploring Insights From Aquinas's Psychology.Daniel D. De Haan - 2019 - New Blackfriars 100 (1090):715-737.
    In this essay I explore the resources Thomas Aquinas provides for enquiries concerning the psychological abilities of nonhuman animals. I first look to Aquinas’s account of divine, angelic, human, and nonhuman animal naming, to help us articulate the contours of a ‘critical anthropocentrism’ that aims to steer clear of the mistakes of a na¨ıve anthropocentrism and misconceived avowals to entirely eschew anthropocentrism. I then address the need for our critical anthropocentrism both to reject the mental-physical dichotomy endorsed by ‘folk psychology’ (...)
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  30.  97
    No Hope in the Dark: Problems for Four-Dimensionalism.Jonathan J. Loose - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):31-47.
    Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to (...)
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  31.  99
    On Schechtman’s Person Life View.Radim Bělohrad - 2014 - Ethical Perspectives 21 (4):565–579.
    In this paper, I provide an analysis of Marya Schechtman's theory of personal identity defended in her book Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.
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  32.  73
    Plenitude, Pluralism, and Neo-Lockean Persons.Harold Noonan - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):108-131.
    The paper discusses the arguments for and against animalism and concludes that a pluralist position which rejects animalism and embraces a multiplicity of thinkers is the best option.
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  33. Moreau’s Law in The Island of Doctor Moreau in Light of Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis.Daniel Paul Dal Monte - 2018 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 1:1-12.
    In this paper, I explore a tension between the Law in the novel The Island of Doctor Moreau, by H. G. Wells, and Kant's reciprocity thesis. The Law is a series of prohibitions that Moreau has his beasts recite. Moreau devotes his time to transforming animals through a painful surgery into beings that resemble humans, but the humanized beasts are constantly slipping back into animalistic habits, and so Moreau promulgates the Law to maintain decorum. Kant's reciprocity thesis states that free (...)
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  34. Personal Identity Without Persons.Jens David Ohlin - 2002 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    The project takes as its starting point our conflicting intuitions about personal identity exposed by Bernard Williams' thought experiment involving the switching of bodies in "The Self and the Future." The conflicted intuitions are identified as animalist and psychologist and correspond roughly with the two major approaches to personal identity. The traditional strategy to resolve the conflict---thought experiments---is critically examined and the project concludes that proper thought experiments will reveal the conflict but are unlikely to resolve it. A new reading (...)
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  35.  29
    Human Mind’s Transformation is Crucial for Self Realization.Devinder Pal Singh & Bhai Harbans Lal - 2021 - Academia Letters 1 (1573):1-5.
    The human mind is central to comprehend and manoeuvre the natural world. Though it is the crown expression of Nature in the mortal world, it is inherently inconsistent. It is often captivated by many animalistic habits. One of the animalistic habits of mind is its fickleness. Sikh theology emphasizes that one must learn how to control and transform one’s mind to come out of this condition. An individual can do so by diverting his/her mind from its feral inclinations and turning (...)
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  36.  27
    Human Mind - Its Fickleness, Transformation and Quietude (A Perspective From Sri Guru Tegh Bahadur's Hymns).Devinder Pal Singh - 2021 - Asia Samachar.
    The human mind possesses matchless creativity and extensive capacity to create its own reality. It has a remarkable capability for contemplation, reflection and even manipulation. Sadly, the excellent human mind has been polluted by the rituals, dogmas, and deceptions of cultures, religions and politics. Its fickleness leads to its being held captive by maya (material world). In his hymns, Guru Tegh Bahadur enunciates that the fickleness of the mind is the primary cause of unhappiness and failure in achieving our prescribed (...)
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  37.  44
    ¿Yo soy una persona?David Villena Saldaña - 2010 - Analítica 4 (4):55-67.
    The persistence problem in relation to us is usually approached from a point of view that gives priority to psychological continuity. My goal in this paper is to advance an argument against it. In order to do so, I start defining the notion of identity and showing the problems that arise from the concept of diachronic identity. Psychological continuity as a criterion of identity for things like us emerges in this context. And, since the mental supervenes on the physical, those (...)
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