Belief as an act of reason

Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-11-07
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Controlling Attitudes.Hieronymi, Pamela

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
44 ( #32,576 of 40,024 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #22,009 of 40,024 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.