Sketch of a Proof-Theoretic Semantics for Necessity

In Nicola Olivetti, Rineke Verbrugge & Sara Negri (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic 13. Booklet of Short Papers. Helsinki: pp. 37-43 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper considers proof-theoretic semantics for necessity within Dummett's and Prawitz's framework. Inspired by a system of Pfenning's and Davies's, the language of intuitionist logic is extended by a higher order operator which captures a notion of validity. A notion of relative necessary is defined in terms of it, which expresses a necessary connection between the assumptions and the conclusion of a deduction.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-08-23
Latest version: 2 (2020-11-13)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
70 ( #48,499 of 2,439,695 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #39,561 of 2,439,695 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.