Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude: A Non-Reductive Characterization

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Contemporary philosophy of mind tends to theorize about the propositional attitudes primarily in terms of belief and desire. But there is a propositional attitude, sometimes called ‘entertaining,’ that seems to resist analysis in terms of belief and desire, and has been thought at other times and places (notably, in late nineteenth-century Austrian philosophy) to be more fundamental than belief and desire. Whether or not we accept the fundamentality of entertaining, it certainly seems to be an attitude ill understood in contemporary philosophy of mind. The purpose of this paper is to make first steps – very first steps – toward a more mature understanding of entertaining.
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Archival date: 2014-06-01
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