Reconceiving Rawls's Arguments for Equal Political Liberty and Its Fair Value

Social Theory and Practice 38 (2):258-278 (2012)
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Abstract
Few have discussed Rawls's arguments for the value of democracy. This is because his arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty should include democratic liberties, are incomplete. Rawls says little about the inclusion of political liberties of a democratic sort – such as the right to vote – among the basic liberties. And, at times, what he does say is unconvincing. My aim is to complete and, where they fail, to reconceive Rawls's arguments and to show that a principle requiring equal political liberty and its fair value is an appropriate component of his theory of justice
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First archival date: 2013-11-19
Latest version: 2 (2013-11-19)
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