Justification of Democracy

Efficiency requires legislative political institutions. There are many ways efficiency can be promoted, and so an ongoing legislative institution is necessary to resolve this choice in a politically sustainable and economically flexible way. This poses serious problems for classical liberal proposals to constitutionally protect markets from government intervention, as seen in the work of Ilya Somin, Guido Pincione & Fernando Tesón and others. The argument for the political nature of efficiency is set out in terms of both Pareto optimality and (...) aggregate welfare maximisation, and similar arguments can be generalised to other social values. (shrink)

In *How Propaganda Works* Jason Stanley argues that democratic societies require substantial material equality because inequality causes ideologically flawed belief, which, in turn, make demagogic propaganda more effective. And that is problematic for the quality of democracy. In this brief paper I unpack that argument, in order to make two points: (a) the non-moral argument for equality is promising, but weakened by its reliance on a heavily moralised conception of democracy; (b) that problem may be remedied by whole-heartedly embracing a (...) more realistic conception of democracy. That conception is at least compatible with Stanley’s argument, if not implicit in parts of it. (shrink)

La tesis central de este trabajo es que la tradicional tensión entre substancia y procedimiento socava las estabilidad de la justificación de la concepción liberal más extendida de la legitimidad (la Democracia Deliberativa). Dicha concepciones enfrentan problemas serios a la hora de articular de manera consistente dos dimensiones que parecen ir naturalmente asociadas a la idea de legitimidad: la dimensión procedimental, vinculada a la equidad del procedimiento, y la dimensión epistémica, asociada a la corrección de los resultados. En este trabajo (...) sostengo que a) esa tensión surge de la adopción de una concepción epistemológica social de tipo "veritativo-consecuencialista; b) es posible manejar dicha tensión mediante el remplazo de la epistemología subyacente por una concepción epistemológica social de tipo procedimentalista de orientación pragmatista y c) dicha operación orienta el diseño institucional en una dirección experimentalista. (shrink)

Several scholars have recently entertained proposals for "epistocracy," a political regime in which decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a society's most informed and competent citizens. These proposals rest on the claim that we can expect better political outcomes if we exclude incompetent citizens from participating in political decisions because competent voters are more likely to vote "correctly" than incompetent voters. We develop what we call the objection from selection bias to epistocracy: a procedure that selects voters on (...) the basis of their observed competence---as epistocracy does---will often be "biased" in the sense that competent voters will be, on average, more likely than incompetent voters to possess certain attributes that reduce the probability of voting correctly. Our objection generalizes the "demographic objection" discussed in previous literature, showing that the range of realistic scenarios in which epistocracy is vulnerable to selection bias is substantially broader than previous discussions appreciate. Our discussion also shows that previous discussions have obscured the force of the threat of selection bias. Since we lack reasons to believe that epistocratic proposals can avoid selection bias, we have no reason to seriously entertain epistocracy as a practical proposal. (shrink)

A widely held picture in political science emphasizes the cognitive shortcomings of us citizens. We’re ignorant. We don’t know much about politics. We’re irrational. We bend the evidence to show our side in the best possible light. And we’re malleable. We let political elites determine our political opinions. This paper is about why these shortcomings matter to democratic values. Some think that democracy’s value consists entirely in its connection to equality. But the import of these shortcomings, I argue, cannot be (...) explained in purely egalitarian terms. To explain it, we must instead think of democracy’s value partly in terms of collective autonomy. Our ignorance and irrationality undermine the epistemic conditions for realizing this kind of autonomy. They stop us knowing the outcomes of our political choices. Our irrationality and malleability undermine the independence conditions for realizing such autonomy. They mean our political choices are subject to problematic kinds of interpersonal influence. Thus, at root, the import of the widely held picture is that, if accurate, it closes off this critical aspect of democracy’s value. (shrink)

Voters have many motivations. Some vote on the issues. They vote for a candidate because they share that candidate’s policy positions. Some vote on performance. They vote for a candidate because they think that that candidate will produce the best outcomes in office. Some vote on group identities. They vote for a candidate because that candidate is connected to their social group. This paper is about these motivations. I address three questions. First, which of these motivations, were it widespread, would (...) be best for intrinsic democratic values? Second, how do the motivations of actual American voters affect the value of American democracy? Third, what motivations should individual American voters have? I argue that widespread issue voting would be best, followed by performance voting, followed by group voting. I argue that American voters do not much contribute to the value of American democracy. Their behavior makes it hard to achieve many democratic values. Finally, I argue that, were America an ideal democracy, American voters would have reason to vote on the issues. But, in their non-ideal democracy, American voters merely have reason to avoid voting on privileged group identities. (shrink)

Epistocratic systems of government have received renewed attention, and considerable opposition, in recent political philosophy. Although they vary significantly in form, epistocracies generally reject universal suffrage. But can they maintain the advantages of universal suffrage despite rejecting it? This paper develops an argument for a significant instrumental advantage of universal suffrage: that governments must take into account the interests of all of those enfranchised in their policy decisions or else risk losing power. This is called ‘the Interests Argument’. One problem (...) for the Interests Argument is that governments are not entirely responsive to voter interests, partly because voters do not always know what is in their interests. I’ll show how this epistemic claim can be used to support certain forms of epistocracy, but deny that it undermines the Interests Argument. I then consider whether we can identify forms of epistocracy that preserve the benefits of the Interests Argument whilst overcoming the epistemic limitations of democracy. I propose six forms of epistocracy, and argue that two are able to maintain these benefits, hence providing an evaluation of the relative strengths of these epistocracies with respect to one of the most valuable instrumental benefits of universal suffrage. Whilst epistocracy lacks many of the advantages of democracy, this paper shows that some forms fare better than others. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that computer simulations can provide valuable insights into the performance of voting methods on different collective decision problems. This could improve institutional design, even when there is no general theoretical result to support the optimality of a voting method. To support our claim, we first describe a decision problem that has not received much theoretical attention in the literature. We outline different voting methods to address that collective decision problem. Under certain criteria of assessment akin (...) to extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we run simulations for the methods using MATLAB, in order to compare their performance under various conditions. We consider and respond to concerns about the use of simulations in the assessment of voting procedures for policymaking. (shrink)

Many contemporary democratic theorists are democratic egalitarians. They think that the distinctive value of democracy lies in equality. Yet this position faces a serious problem. All contemporary democracies are representative democracies. Such democracies are highly unequal: representatives have much more power than do ordinary citizens. So, it seems that democratic egalitarians must condemn representative democracies. In this paper, I present a solution to this problem. My solution invokes popular control. If representatives are under popular control, then their extra power is (...) not objectionable. Unfortunately, so I argue, in the United States representatives are under loose popular control. (shrink)

Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a, 73). However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This (...) article helps fill that gap by offering a formal theory of three different modes of democratic deliberation: myopic discussion, constructive discussion, and debate. We show that myopic discussion suffers from indeterminacy of long run outcomes, while constructive discussion and debate are conclusive. Finally, unlike the other two modes of deliberation, debate is path independent and converges to a unique compromise position, irrespective of the initial status quo. (shrink)

According to a recent interpretive orthodoxy, Spinoza is a profoundly democratic theorist of state authority. I reject this orthodoxy. To be sure, for Spinoza, a political order succeeds in proportion as it harnesses the power of the people within it. However, Spinoza shows that political inclusion is only one possible strategy to this end; equally if not more useful is political exclusion, so long as it maintains what I call the depoliticised acquiescence of those excluded.

This essay develops a model of democratic representation from the standpoint of epistemic theories of democracy. Such theories justify democracy in terms of its tendency to yield decisions that “track the truth” by integrating asymmetrically dispersed knowledge. From an epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as epistemic intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy experts and non-experts, and the horizontal integration of knowledge among diverse non-experts. The primary analytical payoff of this model (...) is that it provides a clear rationale for variation in the norms and institutionalization of representative behavior. Sometimes a delegate-like approach is the right one, and sometimes a trustee-like approach is better. The key determinant is the effect of these models on the epistemic quality of outcomes under different circumstances. Towards the end of the essay, I apply the model to the present revival of populism and consider its implications in that context. (shrink)

"Populism" has long been a dirty word. To some, it suggests the tyranny of the mob, to others, a xenophobic nativism. It is sometimes considered conducive to (if not simply identical to) fascism. In this timely book, Walter Horn acquits populism by "distilling" it, in order to finally give the people the power to govern themselves, free from constraints imposed either by conservatives (or libertarians) on the right or liberals (or Marxists) on the left. Beginning with explanations of what it (...) means to vote and what makes one society better off than another, Horn progresses to issues involving what makes for fair aggregation and appropriate, deliberative representation. From suggesting solutions to contemporary problems like gerrymandering, immigration control, and campaign finance, to offering answers to age-old questions like why dissenters should want to obey the majority and who should have the right to vote in various elections, Horn, using his new theory of "CHOICE Voluntarism," provides solutions to some of the most perplexing problems in the history of democratic theory. -/- The Introduction and first chapter can now be read free at Amazon. (shrink)

Some Confucian scholars have recently claimed that Confucian political meritocracy is superior to Western democracy. I have great reservations about such a view. In this article, I argue that so lo...

Prezentowana książka jest pierwszą monografią w sposób całościowy omawiającą Preambułę Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2.4.1997 r. Dużo miejsca poświęca genezie tekstu - czytelnik znajdzie zgłoszone projekty oraz szerokie omówienie prac Komisji Konstytucyjnej Zgromadzenia Narodowego. W centrum uwagi znalazły się aksjologiczne podstawy całego polskiego systemu prawa oraz refleksja nad wartościami fundującymi porządek prawny w ogóle. Autor omawia poszczególne wartości, uwzględniając ich oddziaływanie na orzecznictwo, zwracając uwagę również na przyjęte przez ustrojodawcę rozstrzygnięcia dotyczące pozaprawnego ugruntowania wartości konstytucyjnych. Podejmuje także problem normatywnego charakteru (...) Preambuły. Książka adresowana jest w sposób szczególny do wszystkich zainteresowanych prawem konstytucyjnym, przede wszystkim w kontekście zagadnień filozoficznoprawnych. Pogłębione rozumienie Preambuły Konstytucji jest istotne także dla wszystkich obywateli, gdyż wskazuje ona na podstawowe wartości leżące u podstaw wspólnoty politycznej. (shrink)

金持ちと有名人に別のテイクはどうですか?まず、ハリー・ポッターの小説は、子供たちが世界に責任を持つのではなく、ファンタジーを信じることを奨励する原始的な迷信です。JKRは、ほとんどの人と同じくらい自分 自身と世界について手がかりはありませんが、平均的なアメリカ人の約200倍、平均的な中国人の約800倍の破壊的です。彼女は、これらのゴミ小説とそれに続くすべての侵食を生み出すために、おそらく30,000 ヘクタールの森林の破壊を担当してきました(地球上のすべての人のために海に少なくとも6トンとおそらく12トン/年の土壌、またはアメリカ人1人あたり100トンなので、ローリングの本やmov iesと彼女の3人の子供たちのために約5000トン/年ですies and her)。地球は毎年表土の少なくとも1%を失うので、2100に近づくにつれて、その食糧栽培能力のほとんどはなくなりました。その後、本や映画、プラスチック人形などを作り、配布するために作られた燃料や廃棄 物の膨大な量があります。彼女は、何百万人もの人々を使って家族計画や熱帯雨林の購入を奨励するのではなく、子供たちを生み出し、イギリス、アメリカ、世界、そして彼女の子孫の将来を破壊している第3世界至上主義 の従来のリベラルな愚かさを促進することによって、社会的責任の欠如を示しています。もちろん、彼女は他の7とそれほど変わりません。80億の手がかりのない - ちょうど騒がしい、より破壊的な. それは無料の昼食の問題は大きいです。暴徒は、他の人に危害を加えずに一人の人を助けることのようなものがないことを見ることができません。過密な世界への新規参入者に与えられた権利や特権は、他の人の権利や特権 を暗くすることしかできません。毎日どこでも目の前で起こっている大規模な生態学的災害にもかかわらず、彼らは前世紀の人口増加の大部分を占める「多様」の拘束されていない母性にそれらを固定することはできません 。彼らは、産業文明の最終的な崩壊に社会の資源と機能に対する日々の攻撃を推定するために必要な知性、教育、経験と正気のいくつかの組み合わせを欠いています。各食事、車やバスでの各旅行、靴の各ペアは、地球の棺 の中の別の釘です。ロンドンからサンフランシスコへの飛行機の1つの座席が、約3平方メートルの海氷を溶かす約1トンの炭素を生産し、過剰な特権の一つとして、彼女はおそらく何百ものフライトを飛ばしたことは、彼 女の心を横切ったことはありません。 金持ちや有名人だけでなく、事実上すべての教師を含むほぼすべての公人は政治的に正しいと圧力を受けており、西洋民主主義では、現在、社会民主主義(ネオマルクス主義者、すなわち希薄な共産主義者)第三世界至上主 義者が自分たちの社会と子孫の破壊のために働くことを意味しています。だから、教育、経験、知性(そして基本的な常識)が欠けている人々は、彼らが公の声明を出すのを全く禁止すべきであるが、すべてのメディアを完 全に支配し、知的で文明的な人々が民主主義、多様性、平等を支持しなければならないという印象を作り出す一方で、真実はこれらが問題であり、解決策ではなく、彼ら自身が文明の主要な敵であるという印象を作り出す。 民主主義第2nd ed(2019年)などによる私の自殺を参照してください .

L’idéal démocratique est accusé d’être irréaliste. Le gouvernement du peuple par le peuple et pour le peuple serait une chimère dans les sociétés contemporaines. Il faudrait lui préférer les visées plus modestes associées à l’élection : un droit de vote égal et la satisfaction du plus grand nombre. La démocratie ne se laisse pourtant pas réduire à la compétition électorale. Les acteurs et les institutions politiques qui s’en réclament invoquent non seulement un marché, où rivalisent des intérêts privés, mais un (...) forum, où s’affrontent des visions adverses de la justice. Ils attendent de la délibération collective qu’elle serve l’autonomie politique et le bien commun, mais savent aussi qu’elle peut les menacer, lorsque la liberté, l’égalité ou la publicité lui font défaut. Cette enquête philosophique interroge la pertinence de l’idéal démocratique pour des sociétés complexes, dotées d’institutions représentatives et soumises à la communication de masse. Elle montre à quelles conditions cet idéal peut aujourd’hui orienter la critique et l’action. Les citoyens peuvent encore aspirer à se gouverner eux-mêmes, donc à délibérer en égaux. -/- The democratic ideal is accused of being unrealistic. Government of the people by the people and for the people would be a chimera in contemporary societies. The more modest aims associated with election should be preferred: equal suffrage and the satisfaction of the greatest number. But democracy cannot be reduced to electoral competition. The political actors and institutions that claim it invoke not only a market, where private interests compete, but also a forum, where opposing visions of justice confront each other. They expect collective deliberation to serve political autonomy and the common good, but they also know that it can threaten them when it lacks freedom, equality or publicity. This philosophical inquiry questions the relevance of the democratic ideal for complex societies with representative institutions and subject to mass communication. It shows under what conditions a deliberative understanding of this ideal can today orient criticism and action. Citizens can still aspire to govern themselves, hence to deliberate as equals. (shrink)

L’objection la plus ancienne et la plus redoutable à la démocratie fait valoir que le gouvernement par le peuple dessert le gouvernement pour le peuple. Les citoyens manquant pour la plupart de sagesse ou de compétence, le bien commun serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un individu éclairé ou à une élite experte. Une réponse commune à cette objection concède la prémisse mais affirme la priorité au gouvernement par le peuple sur le gouvernement pour le peuple : le (...) droit égal à la participation devrait l’emporter sur la promotion de la compétence, même si celle-ci est requise par le bon gouvernement. La démocratie se trouve alors réduite à un ensemble de procédures équitables, traitant les citoyens en égaux ; elle ne se définit plus par la poursuite du bien commun. Il est toutefois une autre réponse à l’objection, qui évite cette dérive vers un procéduralisme étroit. Elle consiste à nier la prémisse et à affirmer la sagesse politique du peuple. Il n’est pas vrai que le gouvernement pour le peuple serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un petit nombre de sages ou d’experts, fussent-ils les meilleurs parmi les citoyens. Cette thèse remarquable peut paraître improbable. Sa défense peut pourtant s’appuyer sur l’un des arguments les plus intrigants élaborés par la philosophie politique aristotélicienne, qui inspire et éclaire les controverses philosophiques contemporaines sur la valeur du régime démocratique : l’argument de la sagesse de la multitude. (shrink)

This short piece draws on political philosophy to show how social media interference operations can be used by hostile states to weaken the apparent legitimacy of democratic governments. Democratic societies are particularly vulnerable to this form of attack because democratic governments depend for their legitimacy on citizens' trust in one another. But when citizen see one another as complicit in the distribution of deceptive content, they lose confidence in the epistemic preconditions for democracy. The piece concludes with policy recommendations for (...) how democratic governments should protect themselves. (shrink)

Америка и мир находятся в процессе краха от чрезмерного роста населения, большинство из них за последнее столетие, и теперь все это, из-за третьего мира людей. Потребление ресурсов и добавление еще 4 миллиардов, около 2100 года, обрушит индустриальную цивилизацию и приведет к голоду, болезням, насилию и войне в ошеломляющих масштабах. Земля теряет по крайней мере 1% своего верхнего слоя почвы каждый год, так как она приближается к 2100, большая часть его потенциала выращивания продуктов питания исчезнет. Миллиарды погибнут, и ядерная война почти (...) наверняка. В Америке это значительно ускоряется благодаря массовой иммиграции и воспроизводству иммигрантов в сочетании со злоупотреблениями, которые стали возможными благодаря демократии. Развратная человеческая природа неумолимо превращает мечту о демократии и разнообразии в кошмар преступности и нищеты. Китай будет продолжать подавлять Америку и весь мир, пока он поддерживает диктатуру, которая ограничивает эгоизм. Коренной причиной краха является неспособность нашей врожденной психологии адаптироваться к современному миру, что заставляет людей относиться к неродственным людям так, как будто у них были общие интересы. Идея прав человека является злой фантазией, пропагандируемой левыми, чтобы отвлечь внимание от беспощадного разрушения земли безудержным 3-м мировым материнством. Это, а также незнание базовой биологии и психологии, приводит к заблуждению социальной инженерии частично образованных, которые контролируют демократические общества. Немногие понимают, что если вы помогаете одному человеку, вы вредите кому-то другому – нет бесплатного обеда, и каждый предмет, который кто-то потребляет, разрушает землю не подлежит ремонту. Следовательно, социальная политика во всем мире является неустойчивой, и один за одним все общества без строгого контроля над эгоизмом рухнет в анархию или диктатуру. Самые основные факты, почти никогда не упоминаемые, таковы, что в Америке или мире не хватает ресурсов для того, чтобы вывести значительную часть бедного населения из нищеты и удержать их там. Попытка сделать это обанкротила Америку и разрушила мир. Способность Земли производить пищу уменьшается с каждым днем, как и наше генетическое качество. И теперь, как всегда, самым большим врагом бедных являются другие бедные, а не богатые. Без драматических и немедленных изменений нет надежды на предотвращение распада Америки или любой страны, которая следует демократической системе. (shrink)

अमेरिका और दुनिया अत्यधिक जनसंख्या वृद्धि से पतन की प्रक्रिया में हैं, पिछली सदी के लिए यह सबसे अधिक है, और अब यह सब, 3 दुनिया के लोगों के कारण. संसाधनों की खपत और 3 अरब से अधिक ca. 2100 के अलावा औद्योगिक सभ्यता पतन और भुखमरी, रोग, हिंसा और एक चौंका देने वाले पैमाने पर युद्ध के बारे में लाना होगा. पृथ्वी हर साल अपने topsoil के कम से कम 1% खो देता है, तो के रूप में यह 2100 (...) के पास, अपने भोजन की बढ़ती क्षमता के सबसे चला जाएगा. अरबों मर जाएगा और परमाणु युद्ध सब कुछ है, लेकिन कुछ है। अमेरिका में, यह बेहद बड़े पैमाने पर आव्रजन और आप्रवासी प्रजनन द्वारा त्वरित किया जा रहा है, लोकतंत्र द्वारा संभव बनाया दुर्व्यवहार के साथ संयुक्त. भ्रष्ट मानव प्रकृति inexorably अपराध और गरीबी का एक दुःस्वप्न में लोकतंत्र और विविधता के सपने बदल जाता है. चीन अमेरिका और दुनिया को पराजित करना जारी रखेगा, जब तक कि वह स्वार्थ को सीमित करने वाली तानाशाही को बनाए रखता है। पतन का मूल कारण हमारे सहज मनोविज्ञान की अक्षमता को आधुनिक दुनिया के अनुकूल है, जो लोगों को असंबंधित व्यक्तियों के इलाज के लिए की ओर जाता है जैसे कि वे आम हितों था. मानव अधिकारों का विचार एक बुरी कल्पना वामपंथियों द्वारा प्रोत्साहित करने के लिए अनियंत्रित 3 दुनिया मातृत्व द्वारा पृथ्वी की बेरहम विनाश से दूर ध्यान आकर्षित है. यह, बुनियादी जीव विज्ञान और मनोविज्ञान की अज्ञानता के अलावा, आंशिक रूप से शिक्षित जो लोकतांत्रिक समाज को नियंत्रित करने के सामाजिक इंजीनियरिंग भ्रम की ओर जाता है. बहुत कम लोग समझते हैं कि अगर आप किसी और को नुकसान पहुँचाने में आपकी मदद करते हैं, तो मुफ्त दोपहर का भोजन नहीं होता और हर एक वस्तु का उपभोग करने से धरती की मरम्मत से परे नष्ट हो जाती है। नतीजतन, हर जगह सामाजिक नीतियां unsustainable हैं और स्वार्थ पर कड़े नियंत्रण के बिना एक के बाद एक सभी समाज अराजकता या तानाशाही में गिर जाएगी. सबसे बुनियादी तथ्यों, लगभग कभी नहीं उल्लेख किया है, कि अमेरिका या दुनिया में पर्याप्त संसाधनों के लिए गरीबी से बाहर गरीबों का एक महत्वपूर्ण प्रतिशत उठा और उन्हें वहाँ रखने के लिए नहीं कर रहे हैं. ऐसा करने का प्रयास अमेरिका को दिवालिया कर रहा है और दुनिया को नष्ट कर रहा है। भोजन का उत्पादन करने के लिए पृथ्वी की क्षमता दैनिक कम हो जाती है, के रूप में हमारी आनुवंशिक गुणवत्ता करता है. और अब, हमेशा की तरह, अब तक गरीबों का सबसे बड़ा दुश्मन अन्य गरीब है और अमीर नहीं है. नाटकीय और तत्काल परिवर्तन के बिना, वहाँ अमेरिका, या किसी भी देश है कि एक लोकतांत्रिक प्रणाली के बाद के पतन को रोकने के लिए कोई उम्मीद नहीं है. (shrink)

미국과 세계는 지난 세기 동안 과도 한 인구 증가에서 붕괴의 과정에, 그리고 지금 그것의 모든, 3 세계 사람들 로 인해. 자원 의 소비와 30 억 더 ca. 2100의 추가는 산업 문명을 붕괴하고 엄청난 규모의 기아, 질병, 폭력과 전쟁을 초래할 것입니다. 지구는 매년 표토의 적어도 1 %를 잃고, 그래서 그것은 2100 에 가까워지면, 그것의 음식 성장 능력의 대부분은 사라질 것입니다. 수십억 달러가 죽을 것이고 핵전쟁은 확실합니다. 미국에서, 이것은 거 대 한 이민 및 이민자 재생산에 의해 크게 가속화 되 고, 민주주의에 의해 (...) 가능 하 게 학대와 함께. 타락한 인간의 본성은 민주주의와 다양성의 꿈을 범죄와 빈곤의 악몽으로 바꾸어 놓습니다. 중국은 이기심을 제한하는 독재를 유지하는 한 미국과 세계를 계속 압도할 것입니다. 붕괴의 근본 원인은 우리의 타고난 심리학이 현대 세계에 적응할 수 없다는 것입니다. 인권의 개념은 제3세계 모성에 의한 무자비한 파괴로부터 주의를 끌기 위해 좌파들이 추진하는 사악한 환상이다. 이것은 기본적인 생물학과 심리학에 대한 무지와 더불어 민주사회를 통제하는 부분적으로 교육받은 사람들의 사회 공학적 망상으로 이어집니다. 당신이 한 사람을 도와주면 다른 사람에게 해를 끼칠 수 있다는 것을 이해하는 사람은 거의 없습니다- 무료 점심식사가 없고, 사람이 소비하는 모든 물건은 수리를 넘어 지구를 파괴합니다. 따라서 모든 곳의 사회 정책은 지속 가능하지 않으며 이기심에 대한 엄격한 통제없이 모든 사회가 무정부 상태 또는 독재로 붕괴될 것입니다. 거의 언급되지 않은 가장 기본적인 사실은 미국이나 세계에 빈곤층의 상당 부분을 들어 올리고 거기에 보관할 자원이 충분하지 않다는 것입니다. 이 것을 시도하는 것은 미국을 파산시키고 세계를 파괴하는 것입니다. 우리의 유전적 품질과 마찬가지로 지구의 식량 생산 능력은 매일 감소합니다. 그리고 지금, 언제나처럼, 지금까지 가난한 자의 가장 큰 적은 다른 가난한 부자가 아닙니다. 극적이고 즉각적인 변화가 없다면 미국이나 민주주의 체제를 따르는 어떤 나라도 막을 희망이 없다. (shrink)

Amerika dan dunia sedang dalam proses runtuhnya dari pertumbuhan penduduk yang berlebihan, sebagian besar untuk abad terakhir, dan sekarang semua itu, karena orang dunia 3. Konsumsi sumber daya dan penambahan 3 miliar lebih CA. 2100 akan runtuh peradaban industri dan membawa kelaparan, penyakit, kekerasan dan perang pada skala yang mengejutkan. Bumi kehilangan setidaknya 1% dari humus setiap tahunnya, sehingga mendekati 2100, sebagian besar kapasitas tumbuh makanan akan hilang. Miliaran akan mati dan perang nuklir semua tapi pasti. Di Amerika, ini sedang (...) sangat dipercepat oleh imigrasi besar-besaran dan reproduksi imigran, dikombinasikan dengan pelecehan yang dimungkinkan oleh demokrasi. Sifat manusia yang rusak tak terelakkan mengubah impian demokrasi dan keragaman menjadi mimpi buruk dalam kejahatan dan kemiskinan. Cina akan terus membanjiri Amerika dan dunia, asalkan mempertahankan kediktatoran yang membatasi keegoisan. Akar penyebab runtuhnya adalah ketidakmampuan psikologi bawaan kita untuk beradaptasi dengan dunia modern, yang menyebabkan orang untuk memperlakukan orang yang tidak terkait seolah-olah mereka memiliki kepentingan bersama. Gagasan tentang hak asasi manusia adalah fantasi jahat yang dipromosikan oleh kaum kiri untuk menarik perhatian jauh dari kehancuran tanpa ampun dari bumi oleh ibu yang tidak terkendali dunia ke-3. Ini, ditambah ketidaktahuan dasar biologi dan psikologi, mengarah pada rekayasa sosial delusi dari sebagian berpendidikan yang mengendalikan masyarakat demokratis. Sedikit memahami bahwa jika Anda membantu satu orang yang Anda menyakiti orang lain-tidak ada makan siang gratis dan setiap item yang dikonsumsi orang menghancurkan bumi di luar perbaikan. Akibatnya, kebijakan sosial di mana-mana tidak berkelanjutan dan satu per satu semua masyarakat tanpa kontrol yang ketat pada keegoisan akan runtuh menjadi anarki atau kediktatoran. Fakta yang paling mendasar, hampir tidak pernah disebutkan, adalah bahwa tidak ada cukup sumber daya di Amerika atau dunia untuk mengangkat persentase yang signifikan dari miskin keluar dari kemiskinan dan menjaga mereka di sana. Upaya untuk melakukan hal ini adalah bangkrut Amerika dan menghancurkan dunia. Kapasitas bumi untuk menghasilkan makanan berkurang setiap hari, seperti halnya kualitas genetik kita. Dan sekarang, seperti biasa, sejauh ini musuh terbesar orang miskin adalah miskin lainnya dan bukan orang kaya. Tanpa perubahan dramatis dan segera, tidak ada harapan untuk mencegah runtuhnya Amerika, atau negara yang mengikuti sistem demokratis. (shrink)

Estados Unidos y el mundo están en proceso de colapso por el crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayor parte del siglo pasado, y ahora todo, debido a la gente del tercer mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 4.000 millones más alrededor de 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y provocarán hambre, enfermedades, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su suelo superior cada año, por lo que a medida que (...) se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es muy segura. En Estados Unidos, esto está siendo enormemente acelerado por la inmigración masiva y la reproducción de inmigrantes, combinado con los abusos que hacen posible la democracia. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla del crimen y la pobreza. China seguirá abrumando a Estados Unidos y al mundo, mientras mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo. La causa fundamental del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. La idea de los derechos humanos es una fantasía maligna promovida por los izquecenas para alejar la atención de la destrucción despiadada de la tierra por la maternidad del tercer mundo sin restricciones. Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si ayudas a una persona, dañas a otra persona, no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una a una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en anarquía o dictadura. Los hechos más básicos, casi nunca mencionados, son que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para sacar a un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacer esto es la bancarrota de Estados Unidos y la destrucción del mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, el mayor enemigo de los pobres es otro pobre y no los ricos. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza de impedir el colapso de Estados Unidos, ni de ningún país que siga un sistema democrático. (shrink)

Abstact : This article provides a critical examination of David Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism. Epistemic proceduralism suggests a promising way to justify democracy without renouncing the pursuit of truth. By making the legitimacy and authority of democratic institutions dependent on their general tendency to produce good decisions, rather than on the correctness of their results or on their mere procedural fairness, it shows that they can to be connected to substantial standards, such as justice, without ignoring the persistence of moral disagreements. (...) By subjecting political procedures to a dual requirement, both epistemic and egalitarian, it suggests that a mixed conception of the value of democracy can be articulated. But by refusing to take sides on the nature of truth, on the choice of the relevant substantial standard, or on the moral theory defining the constraints that equal respect imposes on the choice of political procedures, epistemic proceduralism fails in my view to offer a convincing defence of democracy. In order to explain what makes democracy valuable, a philosophical conception must take a position on the nature of truth, justice and equality. -/- Résumé : Cet article propose une relecture critique du procéduralisme épistémique élaboré par David Estlund. Cette théorie suggère une voie prometteuse pour justifier démocratie sans renoncer à la poursuite de de la vérité. En proposant de faire dépendre la légitimité et l’autorité des procédures démocratiques de leur tendance générale à produire de bonnes décisions, plutôt que de la justesse constante de leurs résultats ou à l’inverse de leur seule équité procédurale, il montre qu’elles peuvent être reliées à une visée substantielle, telle la justice, sans ignorer pour autant la persistance des désaccords à son endroit. En soumettant ces procédures à une double exigence, à la fois épistémique et égalitaire, il montre qu’une conception mixte de la valeur de la démocratie est concevable. Mais en refusant de prendre parti sur la nature de la vérité, sur le choix du critère objectif devant guider l’évaluation des décisions politiques ou sur la théorie morale permettant d’expliciter les contraintes que l’égal égard dû aux personnes impose au choix des procédures, le procéduralisme épistémique s’interdit de construire une justification convaincante de la démocratie. Une justification philosophique de la démocratie doit, pour rendre compte de ce qui fait sa valeur, prendre position sur la nature de la vérité, de la justice et de l’égalité. (shrink)

Una de las bifurcaciones en el debate contemporáneo sobre la legitimidad de la democracia explora si ésta ofrece ventajas distintivamente epistémicas frente a otras alternativas políticas. Quienes defienden la tesis de la democracia epistémica afirman que la democracia es instrumentalmente superior o equiparable a otras formas de organización política en lo que concierne a la obtención de varios bienes epistémicos. En este ensayo presento dos (grupos de) argumentos a favor de la democracia epistémica, que se inspiran en resultados formales: el (...) teorema del jurado de Condorcet [TJC] y el teorema ‘diversidad supera habilidad’ [DSH]. Pese a su gran atractivo, sostengo que estos argumentos son incapaces de respaldar dicha tesis: no brindan razones para considerar que la democracia es epistémicamente superior (o equiparable) a algunas alternativas políticas no democráticas. En su lugar, sugiero que, sin requerir un cambio radical en nuestras formas de organización política, la epistemología democrática –el estudio de las ‘circunstancias epistémicas de la democracia’– puede ofrecer valiosas lecciones de sobre cómo optimizar, en nuestra situación, instituciones y procedimientos de toma de decisiones. Para ello, primero distingo entre varias maneras de evaluar procedimientos de toma de decisión colectiva. Argumento que, al considerarlos como formas de organización política, un factor importante en la evaluación de tales procedimientos involucra asuntos fácticos sobre los cuales puede aspirarse a obtener o promover algunos bienes epistémicos. En este contexto, presento algunos de los argumentos más importantes a favor de la democracia epistémica. A continuación, reúno algunas de las objeciones sobre la aplicabilidad de dichos argumentos y ofrezco razones independientes para dudar de que ofrezcan apoyo a la tesis de la democracia epistémica. Finalmente, defiendo que la epistemología democrática puede desempeñar un papel significativo en la legitimación de formas de organización colectiva que podrían denominarse ‘democráticas’. (shrink)

Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as (...) wide as possible and weight citizens’ votes in accordance with their competence. As it turns out, the optimal system is closely related to J. S. Mill's plural voting proposal. I also explain how voters’ competences can be precisely determined, without reference to an objective standard of correctness and without generating invidious comparisons between voters. (shrink)

Existing accounts of public-goods distribution rely on the existence of solidarity for providing non-universal public goods, such as the humanities or national parks. There are three fundamental problems with these accounts: they ignore instances of social fragmentation; they treat preferences for public goods as morally benign, and they assume that these preferences are the only relevant moral consideration. However, not all citizens unanimously require public goods such as the humanities or national parks. Public-goods distribution that is based only on citizens’ (...) preferences, therefore, means that non-universal public good are at a constant risk of under-provision, and has negative implications for human flourishing. The paper, therefore, develops a complementary justification for the distribution of public goods, that decouples the distribution of public goods from ad hoc preferences, and grounds the distributive justification in the intrinsic value of these goods. There are three reasons to include intrinsic-value considerations in public-goods distribution: responding to crowding-out effects; promoting shared heritage and cross-fertilization. Finally, the intrinsic-value justification may indirectly promote solidarity. Thus, the intrinsic-value and the solidarity justifications need not be mutually exclusive, rather they can be mutually reinforcing. (shrink)

One of the most noticeable trends in recent years has been the increasing reliance of public decision-making processes on algorithms, i.e. computer-programmed step-by-step instructions for taking a given set of inputs and producing an output. The question raised by this article is whether the rise of such algorithmic governance creates problems for the moral or political legitimacy of our public decision-making processes. Ignoring common concerns with data protection and privacy, it is argued that algorithmic governance does pose a significant threat (...) to the legitimacy of such processes. Modelling my argument on Estlund’s threat of epistocracy, I call this the ‘threat of algocracy’. The article clarifies the nature of this threat and addresses two possible solutions. It is argued that neither solution is likely to be successful, at least not without risking many other things we value about social decision-making. The result is a somewhat pessimistic conclusion in which we confront the possibility that we are creating decision-making processes that constrain and limit opportunities for human participation. (shrink)

Cet article a deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer pourquoi l’argument instrumental en faveur de la démocratie est insuffisant pour justifier la délibération politique. Si notre but est l’optimisation du potentiel épistémique d’un régime politique, et que des approches agrégatives et inférentielles (sans délibération) atteignent cet objectif, alors nous ne pouvons plus justifier la délibération sur cette base. Ce problème peut être contourné en reprenant une distinction de Daniel Andler. Pour ce dernier, le groupe délibératif se distingue du groupe (...) agrégatif parce qu’il permet aux agents, par une occasion éducative informelle, de se responsabiliser. La délibération présente donc un potentiel épistémique supérieur, mais qui ne se limite pas à identifier la meilleure réponse dans un temps donné. Le second objectif de l’article est de montrer comme l’argument d’Andler fait le pont entre, d’une part, les théories de la justification publique et, d’autre part, les théories de la démocratie épistémique. (shrink)

The relationship between the necessity to ensure that information is shared in the stages of deliberation and the overcoming of what Dryzek (2001) called constriction of deliberative economy is directly related to the proponents and opponents’ propensity to submit and add information differently, in a plural manner. This article describes the salient features of the deliberative turn in order to defend that this propensity is not individual. The evolution of the public space in science and in politics are both paradigmatic (...) examples to appreciate that individual deliberation, and even mere aggregation of opinions, are consistently interpreted only if they are part of social practices and collective institutions aimed at defending tolerance towards positions, beliefs and interpretations that are different or even confronted. This paper argues that the so called model of contestatory deliberative democracy contributes to the acquisition of knowledge precisely because it fosters a plurality of epistemic states associated with practices as consensus and dissent. (shrink)

Does political decision-making require experts or can a democracy be trusted to make correct decisions? This question has a long-standing tradition in political philosophy, going back at least to Plato’s Republic. Critics of democracy tend to argue that democracy cannot be trusted in this way while advocates tend to argue that it can. Both camps agree that it is the epistemic quality of the outcomes of political decision-making processes that underpins the legitimacy of political institutions. In recent political philosophy, epistemic (...) democrats have embraced this instrumentalist way of thinking about democracy. In this chapter, I argue that the attempt to defend democracy on epistemic instrumentalist grounds is self-undermining. I also develop an alternative – procedural – epistemic defence of democracy. I show that there is a prima facie epistemic case for democracy when there is no procedure-independent epistemic authority on the issue to be decided. (shrink)

There is a fault line running through classical liberalism as to whether or not democratic self-governance is a necessary part of a liberal social order. The democratic and non-democratic strains of classical liberalism are both present today—particularly in America. Many contemporary libertarians and neo-Austrian economists represent the non-democratic strain in their promotion of non-democratic sovereign city-states (startup cities or charter cities). We will take the late James M. Buchanan as a representative of the democratic strain of classical liberalism. Since the (...) fundamental norm of classical liberalism is consent, we must start with the intellectual history of the voluntary slavery contract, the coverture marriage contract, and the voluntary non-democratic constitution (or pactum subjectionis). Next we recover the theory of inalienable rights that descends from the Reformation doctrine of the inalienability of conscience through the Enlightenment (e.g., Spinoza and Hutcheson) in the abolitionist and democratic movements. Consent-based governments divide into those based on the subjects' alienation of power to a sovereign and those based on the citizens' delegation of power to representatives. Inalienable rights theory rules out that alienation in favor of delegation, so the citizens remain the ultimate principals and the form of government is democratic. Thus the argument concludes in agreement with Buchanan that the classical liberal endorsement of sovereign individuals acting in the marketplace generalizes to the joint action of individuals as the principals in their own organizations. (shrink)

Recent attempts to legislate climate science out of existence raises the question of whether citizens are obliged to obey such laws. The authority of democratic law is rooted in both truth and popular consent, but neither is sufficient and they may conflict. These are reconciled in theory and, more importantly, in practice once we incorporate insights from the pragmatist theory of inquiry.

This paper defends a new argument for enabling citizen participation in government: individuals must have genuine opportunities to try to change the law in order to be able to satisfy duties of conscience. Without such opportunities, citizens who regard systems of related laws as partially unjust face a moral dilemma. If they comply with these laws willingly without also trying to change them, they commit a pro tanto wrong by willingly participating in injustice . If they disobey, or if they (...) obey only to avoid sanction, they respond inadequately to the morally important purposes that the laws advance despite their injustice. Government should help citizens avoid this dilemma. This argument bolsters the non-instrumentalist view that responsiveness in the political process is desirable even if it does not promote just legislative outcomes. It also helps to explain what governments owe to citizens with minority political views. (shrink)

The paper discusses the structure, applications, and plausibility of the much-used parallel-case argument for workplace democracy. The argument rests on an analogy between firms and states according to which the justification of democracy in the state implies its justification in the workplace. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, the argument is illustrated by applying it to two usual objections to workplace democracy, namely, that employees lack the expertise required to run a firm and that only capital suppliers should (...) have a say over the governance of the firm. Second, the structure of the argument is unfolded. Third, two salient similarities between firms and states regarding their internal and external effects and the standing of their members are addressed in order to asses the potential and limits of the argument, as well as three relevant differences regarding the voluntariness of their membership, the narrowness of their goals, and the stiffness of the competition they face. After considering these similarities and differences, the paper contends that the the parallel-case argument provides a sound reason in favor of democracy in the workplace—a reason, however, that needs to be importantly qualified and that is only pro tanto. (shrink)

The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem's misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation (...) and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework. Our theorem is related to Ladha's (1993) seminal jury theorem for interchangeable (‘indistinguishable’) voters based on de Finetti's Theorem. We also prove a more general and simpler such jury theorem. (shrink)

The paper considers the gap that exists between between normative and empirical theories of democracy. Empirical theories usually stop in their aspirations where normative theories get off the ground, that is, they take the model of liberal democracy as their normative horizont. This is a confusing situation especially with regard to the possibilities of enhancing the quality of existing liberal democracies. We argue that a simple recalibration of democracy indexes, so as to include normatively more demanding considerations, is impossible, due (...) to certain recurring features of normative models. We conclude that if we want to be serious about bridging the gap, concessions should be made both sides. (shrink)

What should the goals of scientific inquiry be? What questions should scientists investigate, and how should our resources be distributed between different lines of investigation? Philip Kitcher has suggested that we should answer these questions by appealing to an ideal based on the consideration of hypothetical democratic deliberations under ideal circumstances. The paper argues that we have no reason to adopt this ideal. The paper examines both traditional arguments for democracy and Kitcher's own reasons for adopting this ideal, as presented (...) in Kitcher and in Kitcher, and argues that none of these supports adoption of Kitcher's proposed ideal. (shrink)

Imperialism seems to be deeply antithetical to democracy. Yet, at least one form of imperialism – what I call “hands-off imperialism" – seems to be perfectly compatible with the kind of self-governance commonly thought to be the hallmark of democracy. The solution to this puzzle is to recognize that democracy involves more than self-governance. Rather, it involves what I call self-rule. Self-rule is an example of what Philip Pettit has called a modally demanding value. Modally demanding values are, roughly, values (...) the instantiation of which depends not only on what actually happens, but on what would happen in certain non-actual circumstances. Self-rule is the modally demanding counterpart of self-governance, since it requires, not merely that the members of a state actually govern themselves, but that they would continue to do so across a range of non-actual situations. Moreover, the value of self-rule (and hence democracy) is not reducible to the value of self-governance. Understanding the modally demanding character of democracy allows us to appreciate what is democratically objectionable about occupation by a foreign power, even if there is no prospect of the foreign power intervening in the governance of the occupied state by its members. (shrink)

Few have discussed Rawls's arguments for the value of democracy. This is because his arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty should include democratic liberties, are incomplete. Rawls says little about the inclusion of political liberties of a democratic sort – such as the right to vote – among the basic liberties. And, at times, what he does say is unconvincing. My aim is to complete and, where they fail, to reconceive Rawls's arguments and to show that (...) a principle requiring equal political liberty and its fair value is an appropriate component of his theory of justice. (shrink)

This is a Japanese translation of my article "Dürfen wir Kindern das Wahlrecht vorenthalten" ("Are We Justified to Deny Children the Right to Vote?"), which presents a basic moral argument against any age limit with respect to voting rights.

In this article I examine the main conceptions of public reason in contemporary political philosophy in order to set the frame for appreciating the novelty of the pragmatist understanding of public reason as based upon the notion of consequences and upon a theory of rationality as inquiry. The approach is inspired by Dewey but is free from any concern with history of philosophy. The aim is to propose a different understanding of the nature of public reason aimed at overcoming the (...) limitations of the existing approaches. Public reason is presented as the proper basis for discussing contested issues in the broad frame of deep democracy. (shrink)

Political theorists have offered many accounts of collective decision-making under pluralism. I discuss a key dimension on which such accounts differ: the importance assigned not only to the choices made but also to the reasons underlying those choices. On that dimension, different accounts lie in between two extremes. The ‘minimal liberal account’ holds that collective decisions should be made only on practical actions or policies and that underlying reasons should be kept private. The ‘comprehensive deliberative account’ stresses the importance of (...) giving reasons for collective decisions, where such reasons should also be collectively decided. I compare these two accounts on the basis of a formal model developed in the growing literature on the ‘discursive dilemma’ and ‘judgment aggregation’ and address several questions: What is the trade-off between the (minimal liberal) demand for reaching agreement on outcomes and the (comprehensive deliberative) demand for reason-giving? How large should the ‘sphere of public reason’ be? When do the decision procedures suggested by the two accounts agree and when not? How good are these procedures at truthtracking on factual matters? What strategic incentives do they generate for decision-makers? My discussion identifies what is at stake in the choice between minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts of collective decisionmaking, and sheds light not only on these two ideal-typical accounts themselves, but also on many characteristics that intermediate accounts share with them. (shrink)

This article reviews Randall G. Holcombe, From Liberty to Democracy - The Transformation of American Government, The University of Michigan Press, 2002.