Transzendentale Erfahrung als gedankliches Experiment

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Abstract
In my talk I would like to discuss a topic concerning the idea of the mental experience as an experiment in the transcendental philosophy. One can see a big difference between two branches of knowledge: humanitarian sciences and „exact“ sciences. The main difference consists in the fact that the experimental dates of the exact sciences can be verified by other researchers, but the mental dates in the mind of one humanitarian researcher cannot be repeated in the mind of another. It allows for the skeptics to say that the humanitarian sciences cannot be a real science. The modern German philosopher Lambert Wiesing asserts that in the field of transcendental philosophy we have something like an experience in the usual sciences. It is called the „eidetic variation“ (eidetische Variation). Three principles of the method are of great value. They are: self-reflection, phantasy, and self-clarification. In my report I am going to, firstly, clarify the principles of „eidetic variation“ in Husserl’s phenomenology, and secondly relate this to the methods found in German transcendental Idealism. I see three interpretations of the term „eidetic variation“: as a synonym of the transcendental reduction, as achieving an eidos of the thing and the transcendental ego itself, and as something that can be held in a phantasy. The same method is used in German idealism (by Fichte for example). The main outcome of my talk should be, that if we accept an „eidetic variation“ as a transcendental method, we can explain, or at least have the chance, how to build the abstract category and understand such abstract items like beauty and general philosophical notions.
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Archival date: 2016-01-14
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2016-01-14

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