The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn

Logos and Episteme 4 (1):103-111 (2013)
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According to the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox, the paradox can be solved if we conceive of epistemic justification as a species of permissibility. Clayton Littlejohn has objected that the permissibility solution draws on a sufficient condition for permissible belief that has implausible consequences and that the solution conflicts with our lack of knowledge that a given lottery ticket will lose. The paper defends the permissibility solution against Littlejohn's objections.
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Justification as Faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.

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