Seeing mind in action

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KRUSMI
Revision history
First archival date: 2011-08-31
Latest version: 2 (2016-02-28)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Bounds of Cognition.Adams, Frederick & Aizawa, Kenneth

View all 75 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Extended Emotions.Krueger, Joel & Szanto, Thomas

View all 49 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2011-08-31

Total views
1,070 ( #1,693 of 40,688 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
116 ( #3,699 of 40,688 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.