An Evolutionary Account of Guilt?

Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


. Grant Ramsey and Michael Deem argue that appreciating the role that empathy plays in posttransgression guilt leads to a more promising account of the emotion’s evolutionary origins. But because their proposal fails to adequately distinguish guilt from shame, we cannot say which of the two emotions we are actually getting an evolutionary account of. Moreover, a closer look at the details suggests both that empathy may be more relevant for our understanding of shame’s evolutionary origins than guilt’s, and that guilt is unlikely to be an adaptation.

Author's Profile

Charlie Kurth
Western Michigan University


Added to PP

96 (#76,981)

6 months
96 (#23,860)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?