Shames and Selves: On the Origins and Cognitive Foundations of a Moral Emotion

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This paper develops an evolutionary account of shame and its moral value. In so doing, it challenges the standard thinking about shame. Typically, those who approach shame from an evolutionary perspective deny that it is a morally valuable emotion, focusing instead on its social significance. And those who see shame as morally valuable typically set aside questions about shame’s biological origins, if they see them as relevant at all. On my account, shame is an emotion that sensitizes us to self-originating threats to our identities. So understood, shame is morally valuable because it brings a concern to protect our moral identities from damage that we (might) do to them. To develop my identity-driven account, I first argue that we can specify distinctly moral and social forms of shame in terms of the moral and non-moral identities that undergird them. I then show that the resulting account not only makes empirically-supported predictions, but that it also accords with the claim that shame is an evolutionary adaptation. The result is a novel account of the origins and cognitive foundations of a moral emotion.

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Charlie Kurth
Clemson University

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