Is Conceptual Relativism a Prerequisite for Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering?

Filozofia 76 (1):3-17 (2021)
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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to examine whether conceptual relativism is a prerequi-site for conceptual engineering (and if so, then to what extent). In the first part of the paper, I explore and classify varieties of relativism to prepare a distinctive definition of conceptual relativism. In the second part I analyse conceptual relativism and I consequently propose two different readings of conceptual scheme: (i) conceptual scheme as a monolithic, timeless, and determinate systems of meanings, and (ii) conceptual scheme as a system of relatively stable meanings, that is based on agreement and is open to change over time. In the third part of the paper, I show that of those two readings only the second reading of conceptual scheme fits into the practice of conceptual engineering.
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Archival date: 2021-01-27
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